Banking system controlled responsive to data bearing records

ABSTRACT

A banking system operates to cause financial transfers responsive to card data read from data bearing records by a card reader. The system includes at least one automated banking machine comprising a cash dispenser. The system is operative during a cash dispense transaction request to receive through an automated banking machine, user input of data corresponding to a mobile phone number. The system is operative to generate a security code for the requested cash dispense transaction. The system uses the phone number to send the generated security code to the mobile phone. The cash dispense transaction is allowed to proceed only if the system receives machine user input of the sent security code within a predetermined amount of time.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.12/584,491 filed Sep. 4, 2009, which claims benefit of U.S. ProvisionalApplication 61/270,359 filed Jul. 6, 2009.

Application Ser. No. 12/584,491 is also a continuation-in-part of U.S.application Ser. No. 12/455,602 filed Jun. 3, 2009, which is acontinuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 11/370,513 filed Mar. 7, 2006,which claims benefit of U.S. Provisional Application 60/660,070 filedMar. 9, 2005. Application Ser. No. 11/370,513 is a continuation-in-partof U.S. application Ser. No. 10/832,960 filed Apr. 27, 2004, now U.S.Pat. No. 7,118,031, which claims benefit of U.S. Provisional Application60/560,674 filed Apr. 7, 2004. Application Ser. No. 10/832,960 is also acontinuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No. 10/601,813 filed Jun.23, 2003, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,240,827, which claims benefit of U.S.Provisional Application 60/429,478 filed Nov. 26, 2002.

Application Ser. No. 12/584,491 is also a continuation-in-part of U.S.application Ser. No. 12/315,840 filed Dec. 5, 2008, which is acontinuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 11/895,976 filed Aug. 28,2007, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,461,779, which is a divisional of U.S.application Ser. No. 11/714,615 filed Mar. 6, 2007, now U.S. Pat. No.7,392,938, which is a divisional of U.S. application Ser. No. 11/415,531filed May 2, 2006, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,201,313, which is a divisional ofU.S. application Ser. No. 10/795,926 filed Mar. 8, 2004, now U.S. Pat.No. 7,040,533, which is a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser.No. 09/826,675 filed Apr. 5, 2001, now U.S. Pat. No. 6,702,181, which isa divisional of U.S. application Ser. No. 09/076,051 filed May 11, 1998,now U.S. Pat. No. 6,315,195, which claims benefit of U.S. ProvisionalApplication 60/082,299 filed Apr. 17, 1998.

Application Ser. No. 12/584,491 is also a continuation-in-part of U.S.application Ser. No. 11/975,907 filed Oct. 22, 2007, which claimsbenefit of U.S. Provisional Applications 60/918,453; 60/918,455; and60/918,458, each of which was filed Mar. 16, 2007. Application Ser. No.11/975,907 is also a continuation-in-part of U.S. application Ser. No.11/093,741 filed Mar. 29, 2005, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,284,692, whichclaims benefit of U.S. Provisional Application 60/557,937 filed Mar. 31,2004.

Application Ser. No. 12/584,491 is also a continuation-in-part of U.S.application Ser. No. 11/361,327 filed Feb. 23, 2006, now U.S. Pat. No.7,584,885, which is a divisional of U.S. application Ser. No. 10/814,100filed Mar. 31, 2004, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,004,385, which claims benefitof U.S. Provisional Application 60/459,791 filed Apr. 1, 2003.

The disclosure of each of these applications is herein incorporated byreference.

TECHNICAL FIELD

This invention relates to automated banking machines that operateresponsive to data read from data bearing records including user cards,and which may be classified in U.S. Class 235, Subclass 379.

BACKGROUND ART

Automated banking machines may include a card reader that operates toread data from a bearer record such as a user card. Automated bankingmachines may operate to cause the data read from the card to be comparedwith other computer stored data related to the bearer or their financialaccounts. The machine operates in response to the comparison determiningthat the bearer record corresponds to an authorized user, to carry outat least one transaction which may be operative to transfer value to orfrom at least one account. A record of the transaction is also oftenprinted through operation of the automated banking machine and providedto the user. Automated banking machines may be used to carry outtransactions such as dispensing cash, the making of deposits, thetransfer of funds between accounts and account balance inquiries. Thetypes of banking transactions that may be carried out are determined bythe capabilities of the particular banking machine and system, as wellas the programming of the institution operating the machine.

Other types of automated banking machines may be operated by merchantsto carry out commercial transactions. These transactions may include,for example, the acceptance of deposit bags, the receipt of checks orother financial instruments, the dispensing of rolled coin, or othertransactions required by merchants. Still other types of automatedbanking machines may be used by service providers in a transactionenvironment such as at a bank to carry out financial transactions. Suchtransactions may include for example, the counting and storage ofcurrency notes or other financial instrument sheets, the dispensing ofnotes or other sheets, the imaging of checks or other financialinstruments, and other types of transactions. For purposes of thisdisclosure an automated banking machine, automated transaction machineor an automated teller machine (ATM) shall be deemed to include anymachine that may be used to automatically carry out transactionsinvolving transfers of value.

Automated banking machines may benefit from improvements.

OBJECTS OF EXEMPLARY EMBODIMENTS

It is an object of an exemplary embodiment to provide an automatedbanking machine that operates responsive to data bearing records.

It is an object of an exemplary embodiment to provide a more secure wayof conducting transactions with automated banking machines.

It is a further object of an exemplary embodiment to provide anautomated banking machine that includes additional ways for verifyingthat a transaction is authorized.

It is a further object of an exemplary embodiment to provide anautomated banking machine that works in conjunction with a portabledevice such as a mobile phone to further assure that transactions areauthorized.

It is a further object of an exemplary embodiment to provide a systemincluding an automated banking machine that provides features to helpassure that transactions are authorized.

It is a further object of an exemplary embodiment to provide a method ofoperating a banking system.

It is a further object of an exemplary embodiment to provide at leastone article bearing computer executable instructions that are operativeto cause an automated banking machine or other computer to carry outtransactions.

Further objects of exemplary embodiments will be made apparent in thefollowing Detailed Description of Exemplary Embodiments and the appendedclaims.

The foregoing objects are accomplished with a system including anautomated banking machine that operates in response to data bearingrecords. The automated banking machine includes a card reader thatoperates to read data from user cards corresponding to financialaccounts. The automated banking machine includes a user interface thatincludes one or more input devices and output devices. The automatedbanking machine is operative to communicate with one or more remotecomputers to cause financial transfers to and from accountscorresponding to card data read from user cards. The exemplary automatedbanking machine may include a cash dispenser that is operative todispense cash to users of the machine. The automated banking machine maybe operative to accept currency bills, checks or other instruments frommachine users. Other embodiments of automated banking machines mayinclude other types of transaction function devices that operate in thecarrying out of transactions with the machine.

In exemplary embodiments the machine may receive identifying inputs fromusers that are usable to determine that the machine user is authorizedto conduct a requested transaction at the machine. In some embodimentsthis may include the card data and/or other input data which is apersonal identification number (PIN). Such input data may also includebiometric data or other data that can be read from an article orperceived from a user through at least one input device.

In further exemplary embodiments the automated banking machine mayrequire the user to provide additional inputs to the machine or toanother device in order to authorize a transaction. This may include inexemplary embodiments, requiring that the user authorize a transactionin at least one additional way which helps to assure that the personrequesting to conduct the transaction is an authorized user. In someembodiments this may include operation of the automated banking machineto cause a message to be sent to a particular device or network addressassociated with the user. This may include for example, causing a textmessage to be sent to a system address which corresponds to the user'smobile phone or similar device. For example in some embodiments the usermay be notified that a transaction is currently being conducted at anautomated banking machine. The user may be required to provide an inputto the phone in order to authorize the transaction to proceed. This mayinclude for example an authorization input indicating that thetransaction should proceed. Alternatively or in addition the input mayinclude a secret code, biometric input or other authorization input thatis generally known only to or capable of being provided by the user.Alternatively or in addition an automated voice message may be sent to auser's mobile phone to obtain a responsive authorization input.

In other exemplary embodiments operation of an automated banking machinemay cause a message to be sent to a mobile phone or other deviceassociated with the user. The user may be prompted through such amessage to input certain data to or take other actions at the ATM ifthey wish for a transaction to proceed. This may include for example amessage with a random code (or other transaction associated identifier)that is presented to the user, and which code is required to be input tothe ATM in order for the transaction to proceed. Upon input of this codeor other verification thereof, the user is then enabled to proceed withtheir requested transaction. Again such communications may be carriedout through text messages, e-mail messages, automated voice/responsesystems or other suitable systems.

Various approaches may be taken within the scope of the conceptsdescribed herein for purposes of providing improved authenticationtechniques for transactions.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is an isometric external view of an exemplary automated bankingmachine which is an ATM and which incorporates some aspects and featuresdescribed in the present application.

FIG. 2 is a front plan view of the ATM shown in FIG. 1.

FIG. 3 is a transparent side view showing schematically some internalfeatures of the ATM.

FIG. 4 is a schematic view representative of the software architectureof an exemplary embodiment.

FIG. 5 is a front view showing the fascia portion moved to access afirst portion of an upper housing of the machine.

FIG. 6 is a partially transparent side view showing air flow through anair cooling opening of the machine.

FIG. 7 is an isometric view of the ATM shown in FIG. 1 with thecomponents of the upper housing portion removed.

FIG. 8 is a schematic side view of the housing showing schematically theillumination system for the transaction areas and representing inphantom the movement of the upper fascia portion so as to provide accessfor servicing.

FIG. 9 is a schematic view of an illumination and anti-fraud sensingdevice which bounds a card reader slot of an exemplary embodiment.

FIG. 10 is a schematic side view of an unauthorized card reading devicein operative connection with a housing of the anti-fraud sensor.

FIG. 11 is a schematic view of exemplary logic for purposes of detectingthe presence of an unauthorized card reading device in proximity to thecard reader during operation of the ATM.

FIG. 12 is an exemplary side, cross sectional view of an ATM keypad.

FIG. 13 is a schematic representation of a sensor for sensing whether anunauthorized key input sensing device has been placed adjacent to thekeypad.

FIG. 14 is a view of a keypad similar to FIG. 12 but with anunauthorized key input sensing device attached.

FIG. 15 is a schematic representation similar to FIG. 13, butrepresenting the change in reflected radiation resulting from theattachment of the unauthorized key input sensing device.

FIG. 16 shows an automated banking machine security arrangement.

FIG. 17 shows an arrangement for comparing GPS location data to storedlocation data.

FIG. 18 shows an ATM with GPS.

FIG. 19 shows a database portion.

FIG. 20 shows a service provider, database, and requester arrangement.

FIG. 21 shows a flowchart of a service process.

FIG. 22 shows an exemplary fraud prevention service arrangement.

FIG. 23 is a schematic view of an alternative automated banking machinesystem.

FIGS. 24 and 25 are a schematic representation of software logic carriedout by an exemplary automated banking machine used in the system shownin FIG. 23.

FIG. 26 is a simplified schematic representation of software logiccarried out through operation of a server used in the system representedin FIG. 23.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXEMPLARY EMBODIMENTS

Referring now to the drawings and particularly to FIG. 1, there is showntherein an exemplary embodiment of an automated banking machinegenerally indicated 10. In the exemplary embodiment automated bankingmachine 10 is a drive up ATM, however the features described and claimedherein are not necessarily limited to ATMs of this type. The exemplaryATM includes a housing 12. Housing 12 includes an upper housing area 14and a secure chest area 16 in a lower portion of the housing. Access tothe chest area 16 is controlled by a chest door 18 which when unlockedby authorized persons in the manner later explained, enables gainingaccess to the interior of the chest area.

The exemplary ATM 10 further includes a first fascia portion 20 and asecond fascia portion 22. Each of the fascia portions is movably mountedrelative to the housing as later explained, which in the exemplaryembodiment facilitates servicing.

The ATM includes a user interface generally indicated 24. The exemplaryuser interface includes input devices such as a card reader 26 (shown inFIG. 3) which is in connection with a card reader slot 28 which extendsin the second fascia portion. Other input devices of the exemplary userinterface 24 include function keys 30 and a keypad 32. The exemplary ATM10 also includes a camera 34 which operates as an image capture deviceand which also may serve as an input device for biometric features andthe like. The exemplary user interface 24 also includes output devicessuch as a display 36. Display 36 is viewable by an operator of themachine when the machine is in the operative condition through anopening 38 in the second fascia portion 22. Further output devices inthe exemplary user interface include a speaker 40. A headphone jack 42also serves as an output device. The headphone jack may be connected toa headphone provided by a user who is visually impaired to provide theuser with voice guidance in the operation of the machine. The exemplarymachine further includes a receipt printer 44 (see FIG. 3) which isoperative to provide users of the machine with receipts for transactionsconducted. Transaction receipts are provided to users through a receiptdelivery slot 46 which extends through the second fascia portion.Exemplary receipt printers that may be used in some embodiments areshown in U.S. Pat. No. 5,729,379 and U.S. Pat. No. 5,850,075, the entiredisclosures of which are incorporated by reference herein. It should beunderstood that these input and output devices of the user interface 24are exemplary and in other embodiments, other or different input andoutput devices may be used.

In the exemplary embodiment the second fascia portion has includedthereon a deposit envelope providing opening 48. Deposit envelopes maybe provided from the deposit envelope providing opening to users who mayplace deposits in the machine. The second fascia portion 20 alsoincludes a fascia lock 50. Fascia lock 50 is in operative connectionwith the second fascia portion and limits access to the portion of theinterior of the upper housing behind the fascia to authorized persons.In the exemplary embodiment fascia lock 50 comprises a key type lock.However, in other embodiments other types of locking mechanisms may beused. Such other types of locking mechanisms may include for example,other types of mechanical and electronic locks that are opened inresponse to items, inputs, signals, conditions, actions or combinationsor multiples thereof.

The exemplary ATM 10 further includes a delivery area 52. Delivery area52 is in connection with a currency dispenser device 54 which isalternatively referred to herein as a cash dispenser, which ispositioned in the chest portion and is shown schematically in FIG. 3.For purposes hereof, a cash dispenser shall be deemed to include anydevice that causes stored currency such as coins and/or currency billsthat are stored in the machine to be made available externally of themachine so that they may be taken by machine users. The delivery area 52is a transaction area on the machine in which currency sheets aredelivered to a user. In the exemplary embodiment the delivery area 52 ispositioned and extends within a recessed pocket 56 in the housing of themachine.

ATM 10 further includes a deposit acceptance area 58. Deposit acceptancearea is an area through which deposits such as deposit envelopes to bedeposited by users are placed in the machine. The deposit acceptancearea 58 is in operative connection with a deposit accepting devicepositioned in the chest area 16 of the ATM. Exemplary types of depositaccepting devices are shown in U.S. Pat. No. 4,884,769 and U.S. Pat. No.4,597,330, the entire disclosures of which are incorporated herein byreference.

In the exemplary embodiment the deposit acceptance area serves as atransaction area of the machine and is positioned and extends within arecessed pocket 60. It should be understood that while the exemplaryembodiment of ATM 10 includes an envelope deposit accepting device and acurrency sheet dispenser device, other or different types of transactionfunction devices may be included in automated banking machines. Thesemay include for example, check and/or money order accepting devices,ticket accepting devices, stamp accepting devices, card dispensingdevices, money order dispensing devices and other types of devices whichare operative to carry out transaction functions.

In the exemplary embodiment the ATM 10 includes certain illuminatingdevices which are used to illuminate transaction areas, some of whichare later discussed in detail. First fascia portion 20 includes anillumination panel 62 for illuminating the deposit envelope providingopening. Second fascia portion 22 includes an illumination panel 64 forilluminating the area of the receipt delivery slot 46 and the cardreader slot 28. Further, an illuminated housing 66 later discussed indetail, bounds the card reader slot 28. Also, in the exemplaryembodiment an illuminating window 68 is positioned in the recessedpocket 56 of the delivery area 52. An illuminating window 70 ispositioned in the recessed pocket 60 of the deposit acceptance area 58.It should be understood that these structures and features are exemplaryand in other embodiments other structures and features may be used.

As schematically represented in FIG. 3, the ATM 10 includes one or moreinternal computers. Such internal computers include one or moreprocessors. Such processors may be in operative connection with one ormore data stores. In some embodiments processors may be located oncertain devices within the ATM so as to individually control theoperation thereof. Examples such as multi-tiered processor systems areshown in U.S. Pat. No. 6,264,101 and U.S. Pat. No. 6,131,809, the entiredisclosures of which are incorporated herein by reference.

For purposes of simplicity, the exemplary embodiment will be describedas having a single controller which is alternatively referred to hereinas a computer, which controls the operation of devices within themachine. However it should be understood that such reference shall beconstrued to encompass multicontroller and multiprocessor systems as maybe appropriate in controlling the operation of a particular machine. InFIG. 3 the controller is schematically represented 72. Also asschematically represented, the controller is in operative connectionwith one or more data stores 78. Such data stores in exemplaryembodiments are operative to store program instructions, values andother information used in the operation of the machine. Although thecontroller is schematically shown in the upper housing portion of ATM10, it should be understood that in alternative embodiments controllersmay be located within various portions of the automated banking machine.

In order to conduct transactions the exemplary ATM 10 communicates withremote computers. The remote computers are operative to exchangemessages with the machine and authorize and record the occurrence ofvarious transactions. This is represented in FIG. 3 by the communicationof the machine through a network with a bank 78, which has at least onecomputer which is operative to exchange messages with the ATM through anetwork. The bank computer is alternatively referred to herein as ahost. For example, the bank 78 may receive one or more messages from theATM requesting authorization to allow a customer to withdraw $200 fromthe customer's account. In an exemplary embodiment the ATM operates tosend at least one message including data corresponding to card data readfrom the user's card as well as a personal identification number (PIN)and/or other identifying data to the remote computer. The data includedin the one or more messages sent by the ATM enables the remote computerto determine that the user at the ATM is an authorized user who ispermitted to conduct the requested transaction. The remote host computerat the bank 78 will operate to determine that such a withdrawal isauthorized and will return one or more messages to the machine throughthe network authorizing the transaction. After the ATM conducts thetransaction, the ATM will generally send one or more messages backthrough the network to the bank indicating that the transaction wassuccessfully carried out. Of course these messages are merely exemplary.

It should be understood that in some embodiments the ATM may communicatewith other entities and through various networks. For example asschematically represented in FIG. 3, the ATM will communicate withcomputers operated by service providers 80. Such service providers maybe entities to be notified of status conditions or malfunctions of theATM as well as entities who are to be notified of corrective actions. Anexample of such a system for accomplishing this is shown in U.S. Pat.No. 5,984,178, the entire disclosure of which is incorporated herein byreference. Other third parties who may receive notifications fromexemplary ATMs include entities responsible for delivering currency tothe machine to assure that the currency supplies are not depleted. Otherentities may be responsible for removing deposit items from the machine.Alternative entities that may be notified of actions at the machine mayinclude entities which hold marketing data concerning consumers and whoprovide messages which correspond to marketing messages to be presentedto consumers. For example some embodiments may operate in a mannerdescribed in U.S. Pat. No. 7,516,087, the entire disclosure of which isincorporated herein by reference. Various types of messages may beprovided to remote systems and entities by the machine depending on thecapabilities of the machines in various embodiments and the types oftransactions being conducted.

FIG. 4 shows schematically an exemplary software architecture which maybe operative in the controller 72 of machine 10. The exemplary softwarearchitecture includes an operating system such as for example Microsoft®Windows, IBM OS/2® or Linux. The exemplary software architecture alsoincludes an ATM application schematically represented 82. The exemplaryapplication includes the instructions for the operation of the automatedbanking machine and may include, for example, an Agilis™ 91x applicationthat is commercially available from Diebold, Incorporated which is across vendor software application for operating ATMs. Further examplesof software applications which may be used in some embodiments are shownin U.S. Pat. Nos. 6,289,320 and 6,505,177, the entire disclosures ofwhich are herein incorporated by reference.

In the exemplary embodiment middleware software schematically indicated84 is operative in the controller. In the exemplary embodiment themiddleware software operates to compensate for differences betweenvarious types of automated banking machines and transaction functiondevices used therein. The use of a middleware layer enables the moreready use of an identical software application on various types of ATMhardware. In the exemplary embodiment the middleware layer may beInvolve® software which is commercially available from a wholly ownedsubsidiary of the assignee of the present invention.

The exemplary software architecture further includes a diagnostics layer86. The diagnostics layer 86 is operative as later explained to enableaccessing and performing various diagnostic functions of the deviceswithin the ATM. In the exemplary embodiment the diagnostics operate inconjunction with a browser schematically indicated 88.

The exemplary software architecture further includes a service providerlayer schematically indicated 90. The service provider layer may includesoftware such as WOSA XFS service providers for J/XFS service providerswhich present a standardized interface to the software layers above andwhich facilitate the development of software which can be used inconjunction with different types of ATM hardware. Of course thissoftware architecture is exemplary and in other embodiments otherarchitectures may be used.

As schematically represented in FIG. 4, a controller 72 is in operativeconnection with at least one communications bus 92. The communicationsbus may in some exemplary embodiments be a universal serial bus (USB) orother standard or nonstandard type of bus architecture. Thecommunications bus 92 is schematically shown in operative connectionwith transaction function devices 94. The transaction function devicesinclude devices in the ATM which are used to carry out transactions.These may include for example the currency dispenser device 54, cardreader 26, receipt printer 44, keypad 32, as well as numerous otherdevices which are operative in the machine and controlled by thecontroller to carry out transactions. In the exemplary embodiment one ofthe transaction function devices in operative connection with thecontroller is a diagnostic article reading device 96 which may beoperative to read a diagnostic article schematically indicated 98 whichmay provide software instructions useful in servicing the machine.Alternatively and/or in addition, provision may be made for connectingthe bus 92 or other devices in the machine computer device 100 which maybe useful in performing testing or diagnostic activities related to theATM.

In the exemplary embodiment of ATM 10 the first fascia portion 20 andthe second fascia portion 22 are independently movably mounted on theATM housing 12. This is accomplished through the use of hinges attachedto fascia portion 20. The opening of the fascia lock 50 on the firstfascia portion 20 enables the first fascia portion to be moved to anopen position as shown in FIG. 5. In the open position of the firstfascia portion an authorized user is enabled to gain access to a firstportion 102 in the upper housing area 14. In the exemplary embodimentthere is located within the first portion 102 a chest lock input device104. In this embodiment the chest lock input device comprises a manualcombination lock dial, electronic lock dial or other suitable inputdevice through which a combination or other unlocking inputs or articlesmay be provided. In this embodiment, input of a proper combinationenables the chest door 18 to be moved to an open position by rotatingthe door about hinges 106. In the exemplary embodiment the chest door isopened once the proper combination has been input by manipulating alocking lever 108 which is in operative connection with a boltwork. Theboltwork which is not specifically shown, is operative to hold the chestdoor in a locked position until the proper combination is input. Uponinput of the correct combination the locking lever enables movement ofthe boltwork so that the chest door can be opened. The boltwork alsoenables the chest door to be held locked after the activities in thechest portion have been conducted and the chest door is returned to theclosed position. Of course in other embodiments other types ofmechanical or electrical locking mechanisms may be used. In theexemplary embodiment the chest lock input device 104 is in supportingconnection with a generally horizontally extending dividing wall 110which separates the chest portion from the upper housing portion. Ofcourse this housing structure is exemplary and in other embodimentsother approaches may be used.

An authorized servicer who needs to gain access to an item, component ordevice of the ATM located in the chest area may do so by opening thefascia lock and moving the first fascia portion 20 so that the area 102becomes accessible. Thereafter the authorized servicer may access andmanipulate the chest lock input device to receive one or more inputs,which if appropriate enables unlocking of the chest door 18. The chestdoor may thereafter be moved relative to the housing and about itshinges 106 to enable the servicer to gain access to items, devices orcomponents within the chest. These activities may include for exampleadding or removing currency, removing deposited items such as envelopesor checks, or repairing mechanisms or electrical devices that operate toenable the machine to accept deposited items or to dispense currency.When servicing activity within the chest is completed, the chest doormay be closed and the locking lever 108 moved so as to secure theboltwork holding the chest door in a closed position. Of course thisstructure and service method is exemplary and in other embodiments otherapproaches may be used.

In the exemplary embodiment the second fascia portion 22 is also movablerelative to the housing of the machine. In the exemplary embodiment thesecond fascia portion 22 is movable in supporting connection with arollout tray 112 schematically shown in FIG. 3. The rollout tray isoperative to support components of the user interface thereon as well asthe second fascia portion. The rollout tray enables the second fasciaportion to move outward relative to the ATM housing thereby exposingcomponents and transaction function devices supported on the tray andproviding access to a second portion 114 within the upper housing andpositioned behind the second fascia portion. Thus as can be appreciated,when the second fascia portion is moved outward, the components on thetray are disposed outside the housing of the machine so as to facilitateservicing, adjustment and/or replacement of such components. Furthercomponents which remain positioned within the housing of the machine asthe rollout tray is extended, become accessible in the second portion asthe second fascia portion 22 is disposed outward and away from thehousing.

In the exemplary embodiment the rollout tray 112 is in operativeconnection with a releasable locking device. The locking device isgenerally operative to hold the tray in a retracted position such thatthe second fascia portion remains in an operative position adjacent tothe upper housing area as shown in FIGS. 1, 2 and 3. This releasablelocking mechanism may comprise one or more forms of locking typedevices. In the exemplary embodiment the releasable locking mechanismmay be released by manipulation of an actuator 116 which is accessibleto an authorized user in the first portion 102 of the upper housing 14.As a result an authorized servicer of the machine is enabled to move thesecond fascia portion outward for servicing by first accessing portion102 in the manner previously discussed. Thereafter by manipulating theactuator 116 the second fascia portion is enabled to move outward asshown in phantom in FIG. 8 so as to facilitate servicing components onthe rollout tray. Such components may include for example a printer orcard reader. After such servicing the second fascia portion may be movedtoward the housing so as to close the second portion 114. Such movementin the exemplary embodiment causes the rollout tray to be latched andheld in the retracted position without further manipulation of theactuator. However, in other embodiments other types of lockingmechanisms may be used to secure the rollout tray in the retractedposition. It should be understood that this approach is exemplary and inother embodiments other approaches may be used.

As best shown in FIG. 7 in which the components supported in the upperhousing are not shown, the delivery area 52 and the deposit acceptancearea 58 are in supporting connection with the chest door 18. As suchwhen the chest door 18 is opened, the delivery area 52 and the depositacceptance area 58 will move relative to the housing of the machine. Theexemplary embodiment shown facilitates servicing of the machine byproviding for the illumination for the transaction areas by illuminationsources positioned in supporting connection with the rollout tray 112.As best shown in FIG. 6, these illumination sources 118 are movable withthe rollout tray and illuminate in generally a downward direction. Inthe operative position of the second fascia portion 22 and the chestdoor 18, the illumination sources are generally aligned with apertures120 and 122 which extend through the top of a cover 124 which generallysurrounds the recessed pockets 60 and 56. As shown in FIG. 10 aperture120 is generally vertically aligned with window 68 and aperture 122 isgenerally aligned with window 70. In an exemplary embodiment apertures120 and 122 each have a translucent or transparent lens positionedtherein to minimize the risk of the introduction of dirt or othercontaminants into the interior of the cover 124.

As can be appreciated from FIGS. 6 and 8, when the chest door 18 isclosed and the second fascia portion 22 is moved to the operativeposition, the illumination sources 118 are positioned in generallyaligned relation with apertures 120 and 122. As a result theillumination of the illumination devices is operative to cause light tobe transmitted through the respective aperture and to illuminate thetransaction area within the corresponding recessed pocket.

In operation of an exemplary embodiment, the controller executesprogrammed instructions so as to initiate illumination of eachtransaction area at appropriate times during the conduct oftransactions. For example in the exemplary embodiment if the user isconducting a cash withdrawal transaction, the controller may initiateillumination of the delivery area 52 when the cash is delivered thereinand is available to be taken by a user. Such illumination draws theuser's attention to the need to remove the cash and will point out tothe user that the cash is ready to be taken. In the exemplary embodimentthe controller is programmed so that when the user takes the cash themachine will move to the next transaction step. After the cash is sensedas taken, the controller may operate to cease illumination of thedelivery area 56. Of course these approaches are exemplary.

Likewise, in an exemplary embodiment, if a user of the machine indicatesthat they wish to conduct a deposit transaction, the controller maycause the machine to operate to initiate illumination of the depositacceptance area 58. The user's attention is drawn to the place wherethey must insert the deposit envelope in order to have it be accepted inthe machine. In the exemplary embodiment the controller may operate toalso illuminate the illumination panel 62 to illuminate the depositenvelope providing opening 48 so that the user is also made aware of thelocation from which a deposit envelope may be provided. In an exemplaryembodiment the controller may operate to cease illumination through thewindow 70 and/or the illumination panel 62 after the deposit envelope isindicated as being sensed within the machine.

In alternative embodiments other approaches may be taken. This mayinclude for example drawing the customer's attention to the particulartransaction area by changing the nature of the illumination in therecessed pocket to which the customer's attention is to be drawn. Thismay be done for example by changing the intensity of the light, flashingthe light, changing the color of the light or doing other actions whichmay draw a user's attention to the appropriate transaction area.Alternatively or in addition, a sound emitter, vibration, projectingpins or other indicator may be provided for visually impaired users soas to indicate to them the appropriate transaction area to which thecustomer's attention is to be drawn. Of course these approaches areexemplary and in other embodiments other approaches may be used.

As previously discussed the exemplary embodiment of ATM 10 is alsooperative to draw a user's attention at appropriate times to the cardreader slot 28. ATM 10 also includes features to minimize the risk ofunauthorized interception of card data by persons who may attempt toinstall a fraud device such as an unauthorized card reading device onthe machine. As shown in FIG. 9, the exemplary card slot 28 extendsthrough a card slot housing 66 which extends in generally surroundingrelation of the card slot. It should be understood that although thehousing 66 generally bounds the entire card slot, in other embodimentsthe principles described herein may be applied by bounding only one ormore sides of a card slot as may be appropriate for detectingunauthorized card reading devices. Further, it should be understood thatwhile the exemplary embodiment is described in connection with a cardreader that accepts a card into the machine, the principles beingdescribed may be applied to types of card readers that do not accept acard into the machine, such as readers where a user draws the cardthrough a slot, inserts and removes a card manually from a slot andother card reading structures.

In the exemplary embodiment the housing 66 includes a plurality ofradiation emitting devices 126. The radiation emitting devices emitvisible radiation which can be perceived by a user of the machine.However, in other embodiments the radiation emitting devices may includedevices which emit nonvisible radiation such as infrared radiation, butwhich nonetheless can be used for sensing the presence of unauthorizedcard reading devices adjacent to the card slot. In the exemplaryembodiment the controller operates to illuminate the radiation emittingdevices 126 at appropriate times during the transaction sequence. Thismay include for example times during transactions when a user isprompted to input the card into the machine or alternatively when a useris prompted to take the card from the card slot 28. In variousembodiments the controller may be programmed to provide solidillumination of the radiation emitting devices or may vary the intensityof the devices as appropriate to draw the user's attention to the cardslot.

In the exemplary embodiment the card slot housing 66 includes thereinone or more radiation sensing devices 128. The radiation sensing devicesare positioned to detect changes in at least one property of theradiation reflected from the emitting devices 126. The sensing devices128 are in operative connection with the controller. The controller isoperative responsive to its programming to compare one or more valuescorresponding to the magnitude and/or other properties of radiationsensed by one or more of the sensors, to one or more stored values andto make a determination whether the comparison is such that there is aprobable unauthorized card reading device installed on the fascia of themachine. In some embodiments the controller may be operative to executefuzzy logic programming for purposes of determining whether the naturesof the change in reflected radiation or other detected parameters aresuch that there has been an unauthorized device installed and whetherappropriate personnel should be notified.

FIG. 10 shows a side view of the housing 66. An example of a frauddevice which comprises unauthorized card reading device 130 is shownattached externally to the housing 66. The unauthorized card readingdevice includes a slot 132 generally aligned with slot 128. The device130 also includes a sensor shown schematically as 134 which is operativeto sense the encoded magnetic flux reversals which represent data on themagnetic stripe of a credit or debit card. As can be appreciated, anarrangement of the type shown in FIG. 10 enables the sensor 134 ifproperly aligned adjacent to the magnetic stripe of a card, to read thecard data as the card passes in and out of slot 128. Such anunauthorized reading device may be connected via radio frequency (RF) orthrough inconspicuous wiring to other devices which enable interceptionof the card data. In some situations criminals may also endeavor toobserve the input of the user's PIN corresponding to the card data so asto gain access to the account of the user.

As can be appreciated from FIG. 10 the installation of the unauthorizedcard reading device 130 changes the amount of radiation from emittingdevices 126 and that is reflected or otherwise transmitted to thesensors 128. Depending on the nature of the device and its structure,the amount or other properties of radiation may increase or decrease.However, a detectable change will often occur in the magnitude or otherproperties of sensed radiation between a present transaction and a priortransaction which was conducted prior to an unauthorized card readingdevice being installed. Of course the sensing of the magnitude ofradiation is but one example of a property of radiation that may besensed as having changed so as to indicate the presence of anunauthorized reading device.

FIG. 11 demonstrates an exemplary simplified logic flow executed by acontroller for detecting the installation of an unauthorized cardreading device. It should be understood that this transaction logic ispart of the overall operation of the machine to carry out transactions.In this exemplary logic flow the machine operates to carry out cardreading transactions in a normal manner and to additionally execute therepresented steps as a part of such logic each time a card is read. Froman initial step 136 the controller in the machine is operative to sensethat a card is in the reader within the machine in a step 138. Generallyin these circumstances the controller will be operating the radiationemitting devices 126 as the user has inserted their card and the cardhas been drawn into the machine. In this exemplary embodiment thecontroller continues to operate the radiation emitting devices andsenses the radiation level or levels sensed by one or more sensors 128.This is done in a step 140.

The controller is next operative to compare the signals corresponding tothe sensed radiation levels to one or more values in a step 142. Thiscomparison may be done a number of ways and may in some embodimentsexecute fuzzy logic so as to avoid giving false indications due toacceptable conditions such as a user having the user's finger adjacentto the card slot 28 during a portion of the transaction. In the case ofa user's finger for example, the computer may determine whether anunauthorized reading device is installed based on the nature, magnitudeand changes during a transaction in sensed radiation, along withappropriate programmed weighing factors. Of course various approachesmay be used within the scope of the concept discussed herein. However,based on the one or more comparisons in step 142 the controller isoperative to make a decision at step 144 as to whether the sensedvalue(s) compared to stored value(s) compared in step 142 have adifference that is in excess of one or more thresholds which suggestthat an unauthorized card reading device has been installed.

If the comparison does not indicate a result that exceeds thethreshold(s) the ATM transaction devices are run as normal asrepresented in a step 146. For example, a customer may be prompted toinput a PIN, and if the card data and PIN are valid, the customer may beauthorized to conduct a cash dispensing transaction through operation ofthe machine. Further in the exemplary embodiment, the controller mayoperate to adjust the stored values to some degree based on the morerecent readings. This may be appropriate in order to compensate for theeffects of dirt on the fascia or loss of intensity of the emittingdevices or other factors. This is represented in a step 148. In step 148the controller operates the ATM to conduct transaction steps in theusual manner as represented in a step 150.

If in step 144 the difference between the sensed and stored valuesexceeds the threshold(s), then this is indicative that an unauthorizedcard reading device may have been installed since the last transaction.In the exemplary embodiment when this occurs, the controller isoperative to present a warning screen to the user as represented in astep 152. This warning screen may be operative to advise the user thatan unauthorized object has been sensed adjacent to the card reader slot.This may warn a user for example that a problem is occurring.Alternatively if a user has inadvertently placed innocently some objectadjacent to the card reader slot, then the user may withdraw it. Inaddition or in the alternative, further logic steps may be executed suchas prompting a user to indicate whether or not they can see theradiation emitting devices being illuminated adjacent to the card slotand prompting the user to provide an input to indicate if such items arevisible. Additionally or in the alternative, the illuminating deviceswithin the housing 66 may be operative to cause the emitting devices tooutput words or other symbols which a user can indicate that they cansee or cannot see based on inputs provided as prompts from outputdevices of the machine. This may enable the machine to determine whetheran unauthorized reading device has been installed or whether the sensedcondition is due to other factors. It may also cause a user to note theexistence of the reading device and remove it. Of course variousapproaches could be taken depending on the programming of the machine.

If an unauthorized reading device has been detected, the controller inthe exemplary embodiment will also execute a step 154 in which a statusmessage is sent to an appropriate service provider or other entity toindicate the suspected problem. This may be done for example through useof a system like that shown in U.S. Pat. No. 5,984,178 the entiredisclosure of which is herein incorporated by reference. Alternativelymessages may be sent to system addresses in a manner like that shown inU.S. Pat. No. 6,289,320 the entire disclosure of which is also hereinincorporated by reference. In a step 156 the controller will alsooperate to record data identifying for the particular transaction inwhich there has been suspected interception of the card holder's carddata. In addition or in the alternative, a message may be sent to thebank or other institution alerting them to watch for activity in theuser's card account for purposes of detecting whether unauthorized useis occurring. Alternatively or in addition, some embodiments may includecard readers that change, add or write data to a user's card in cases ofsuspected interception. Such changed data may be tracked or otherwiseused to assure that only a card with the modified data is useablethereafter. Alternatively or in addition, in some embodiments themodified card may be moved in translated relation, moved irregularly orotherwise handled to reduce the risk that modified data is interceptedas the card is output from the machine. Of course these approaches areexemplary of many that may be employed.

In the exemplary embodiment the ATM is operated to conduct a transactioneven in cases where it is suspected that an unauthorized card readingdevice has been installed. This is represented in a step 158. However,in other embodiments other approaches may be taken such as refusing toconduct the transaction. Other steps may also be taken such as capturingthe user's card and advising the user that a new one will be issued.This approach may be used to minimize the risk that unauthorizedtransactions will be conducted with the card data as the card can bepromptly invalidated. Of course other approaches may be taken dependingon the programming of the machine and the desires of the systemoperator. In addition while the fraud device shown is an unauthorizedcard reading device, the principles described may also be used to detectother types of fraud devices such as for example false fascias, userinterface covers and other devices.

In some embodiments additional or alternative features and methods maybe employed to help detect the presence of unauthorized card readingdevices or other attempted fraud devices in connection with the ATM. Forexample in some embodiments an oscillation sensor may be attached to themachine to detect changes in frequency or vibration that result from theinstallation of unauthorized devices on the ATM. FIG. 10 showsschematically an oscillator 127 attached to the interior surface of theATM fascia. Oscillator 127 may be operative responsive to the controllerand suitable vibration circuitry to impart vibratory motion to thefascia in the vicinity of the card reader slot. A sensor 129 is inoperative connection with the fascia and is operative to sense at leastone parameter of the motion imparted to the fascia by the oscillator127. Although oscillator 127 and sensor 129 are shown as separatecomponents, it should be understood that in some embodiments thefunctions of the components may be performed by a single device.

The sensor 129 is in operative connection with the controller of the ATMthrough appropriate circuitry. The controller selectively activates theoscillator and the sensor 129 is operative to sense the resultingmovement of the fascia caused by the oscillation. The installation of anunauthorized card reading device or other fraud device on the ATM willgenerally result in a change in at least one property being sensed bythe sensor 129. This may include changes in amplitude, frequency orboth. Alternatively or in addition, some embodiments may provide for theoscillator to impart vibration characteristics of various types orvibratory motion through a range of frequencies and/or amplitudes.Sensed values for various oscillatory driving outputs may then becompared through operation of the controller to one or more previouslystored values. Variances from prior values may be detected or analyzedthrough operation of the controller and notifications given insituations where a change has occurred which suggests the installationof an unauthorized device.

In some embodiments the controller may cause the oscillator and sensorto operate periodically to sense for installation of a possibleunauthorized device. Alternatively, the controller may cause such acheck to be made during each transaction. Alternatively in someembodiments oscillation testing may be conducted when a possibleunauthorized device is detected by sensing radiation properties. Thecontroller may operate to take various actions in response to sensing apossible unauthorized reading device through vibration, radiation orboth. For example detecting a possible fraud device by both radiationand oscillation may warrant taking different actions than only detectinga possible fraud device through only one test or condition.

In some embodiments the controller may be programmed to adjust thethresholds or other limits used for resolving the presence of a possiblefraud device for responses to changes that occur over time at themachine. This may include for example adjusting the thresholds forindicating possible fraud conditions based on the aging of theoscillator or the sensor. Such adjustments may also be based onparameters sensed by other sensors which effect vibration properties.These may include for example, the fascia temperature, air temperature,relative humidity and other properties. Of course readings from theseand other sensors may be used to adjust thresholds of the oscillationsensor, radiation sensor or other fraud device sensors. Variousapproaches may be taken depending on the particular system.

In some embodiments the oscillator may additionally or alternatively beused to prevent the unauthorized reading of card reader signals. Thismay be done for example when the banking machine has a device whichtakes a user card into the machine for purposes of reading data on thecard. In such embodiments the controller may operate to vibrate the areaof the fascia adjacent to the card reader slot when a user's card ismoving into and/or out of the slot. In such cases the vibration may beoperative to cause the generation of noise or inaccurate reading by anunauthorized card reading sensor so as to make it more difficult tointercept the card stripe data using an unauthorized reading device. Insome embodiments such vibration may also serve to disclose or make moreapparent the presence of unauthorized card reading devices. Of coursethese approaches are exemplary and in other embodiments other approachesmay be used.

In some exemplary embodiments provision may be made for detecting thepresence of unauthorized input sensing devices for sensing a user'sinputs through the keypad on the ATM. Such unauthorized input sensingdevices may be used by criminals to sense the PIN input by the user.Detecting unauthorized devices may be accomplished by providingappropriate sensing devices in or adjacent to the keypad. Such sensingdevices may be operative to detect that a structure has been placed overor adjacent to the keypad. Such sensors may be in operative connectionwith the controller in the machine or other devices which are operativeto determine the probable installation of such an unauthorized inputsensing device. In response to determining the probable installation ofsuch a device, the controller may be operative in accordance with itsprogramming to provide notification to appropriate entities, modify theoperation of the machine such as to disable operation or prevent certainoperations, or to take other appropriate actions.

FIG. 12 shows the cross-sectional view of exemplary keypad 32. Keypad 32is shown schematically, and it should be understood that not all of thecomponents of the keypad are represented. Keypad 32 includes a pluralityof keys 250. Keys 250 are moveable responsive to pressure applied by auser's finger to provide an input corresponding to alphabetical ornumerical characters. Extending between some of the keys 250 are areasor spaces 252. Extending in spaces 252 are sensors 254. In the exemplaryembodiment the sensors 254 are radiation type sensors, but as previouslydiscussed, in other embodiments other approaches may be used. Overlyingthe sensors 254 is an outer layer 256. In the exemplary embodiment,layer 256 is translucent or otherwise comprised of material so as topartially enable the transmission of radiation from the sensorstherethrough.

As represented in FIG. 13, the exemplary sensors 254 include a radiationemitter 258 and a radiation receiver 260. During operation the radiationemitter is operative to output radiation that is at least partiallyreflected from the inner surface of layer 256. The reflected radiationis received by the receiver 260. Corresponding electrical signals areproduced by the receiver, and such signals are transmitted throughappropriate circuitry so as to enable the controller to detect thechanges in signals that correspond to probable presence of anunauthorized reading device.

FIG. 14 is a schematic view of an unauthorized input intercepting device262 that has been positioned in overlying relation of a keypad 32. Theinput intercepting device 262 includes false keys 264 which are moveableand which are operatively connected to the corresponding keys 250 of thekeypad. In the exemplary embodiment, input intercepting device 262includes sensors which are operative to detect which of the false keys264 have been depressed by a user. Because the depression of the falsekeys is operative to actuate the actual keys 250, the ATM is enabled tooperate with the device 262 in place. Input intercepting device 262 inexemplary embodiments may include a wireless transmitter or othersuitable device for transmitting the input signals to a criminal who mayintercept such inputs.

As represented in FIG. 19, the input intercepting device 262 includesportions 267 which extend in the areas 252 in overlying relation oflayer 256. As represented in FIG. 15, the portion of the inputintercepting device extending in overlying relation of the layer 256 isoperative to cause a change in the amount of radiation from the emitter258 that is reflected and sensed by the receiver 260 of the sensor. Thisis because the overlying portion will have different radiationreflecting or absorbing characteristics which will change the radiationreflective properties of the layer 256 compared to when no such inputintercepting device is present. Thus the installation of theunauthorized input intercepting device can be detected.

In some exemplary embodiments the controller may be operative to sensethe level of reflected radiation at the sensors periodically. This maybe done, for example, between transactions when a user is not operatingthe terminal. This may avoid giving a false indication that anunauthorized input intercepting device has been installed when a user isresting a hand or some other item adjacent to the keypad during atransaction. Of course in other embodiments sensor readings can be takenand compared during transactions to prior values stored in a data storeto determine if a change lasting longer than normal has occurred whichsuggests that an unauthorized input intercepting device has beeninstalled rather than a user has temporarily placed their hand or someother item adjacent to the keypad. For example, in some exemplaryembodiments the controller may not resolve that there is a probableunauthorized input intercepting device on the machine until asignificant change from a prior condition is detected in the radiationproperties adjacent to the keypad on several occasions both during atransaction and thereafter. Alternatively or in addition, a controllermay be operative to determine that an improper device has been installedas a result of changes that occur during a time when no transactionshave occurred. Alternatively in other embodiments, the controller mayoperate to sense and analyze signals from the sensors responsive todetecting inputs from other sensors, such as for example an ultrasonicsensor which senses that a person has moved adjacent to the machine buthas not operated the machine to conduct a transaction. Of course theseapproaches are merely exemplary of many approaches that may be used.

It should be understood that although in the exemplary embodimentradiation type sensors are used for purposes of detection, in otherembodiments other types of sensors may be used. These include, forexample, inductance sensors, sonic sensors, RF sensors, or other typesof sensing approaches that can be used to detect the presence ofmaterial in locations that suggest an unauthorized input interceptingdevice being positioned adjacent to the keypad. Further, in someembodiments the controller or other circuitry associated with thesensors may be operative to make adjustments for normal changes that mayoccur at the machine. These may include, for example, changes with timedue to aging of emitters, the build up of dirt in the area adjacent tothe keypad, weather conditions, moisture conditions, scratching of thesurface of the sensing layer, or other conditions which may normallyoccur. Appropriate programs may be executed by the controller or othercircuitry so as to recalibrate and/or compensate for such conditions asmay occur over time while still enabling the detection of a rapid changewhich is sufficiently significant and of such duration so as to indicatethe probable installation of an unauthorized input intercepting device.Of course these approaches are exemplary of many approaches that may beused.

In other embodiments other or additional approaches to detectingfraudulent reading or other improper activities may be used. Forexample, in some embodiments the fascia of the banking machine may besubject to observation within a field of view of one or more imagingdevices such as camera 131 schematically represented in FIG. 10. Camera15 may be in operative connection with an image capture system of thetype shown in U.S. Pat. No. 6,583,813, the entire disclosure of which isherein incorporated by reference.

In some embodiments the controller and/or an image capture system may beoperative to execute sequences of activities responsive to triggeringevents that may be associated with attempts to install or operate frauddevices. For example, the presence of a person in front of the bankingmachine may be sensed through image analysis, weight sensors, sonicdetectors or other detectors. The person remaining in proximity to themachine for a selected period or remaining too long after a transactionmay constitute a triggering event which is operative to cause the systemto take actions in a programmed sequence. Such actions may includecapturing images from one or more additional cameras and/or moving imagedata from one or more cameras from temporary to more permanent storage.The sequence may also include capturing image data from the fascia totry to detect tampering or improper devices. Radiation or vibrationtests may also be conducted as part of a sequence. Notifications and/orimages may also be sent to certain entities or system addresses. Ofcourse these actions are exemplary.

In some exemplary embodiments the controller of the ATM or otherconnected computers may be operatively programmed to analyze conditionsthat are sensed and to determine based on the sensed conditions that afraud device is installed. Such a programmed computer may be operativeto apply certain rules such as to correlate the repeated sensing ofabnormal conditions with a possible fraud or tampering condition and toconduct tests for the presence of fraud devices. Such events mayconstitute soft triggers for sequences or other actions to detect andreduce the risk of fraud devices. Of course these approaches are merelyexemplary and in other embodiments other approaches may be used.

In some embodiments the ATM may include sensors adapted to interceptsignals from unauthorized card readers or customer input interceptingdevices. For example, some fraud devices may operate to transmit RFsignals to a nearby receiver operated by a criminal. The presence ofsuch RF signals in proximity to the ATM may be indicative of theinstallation of such a device. Such signals may be detected byappropriate circuitry and analyzed through operation of the ATMcontroller or other processor, and if it is determined that it isprobable that such a device is installed, programmed actions may betaken.

For example, in some embodiments suitable RF shielding material may beapplied to or in the fascia to reduce the level of RF interference fromdevices within the ATM at the exterior of the fascia. Antennas or otherappropriate radiation sensing devices may be positioned adjacent to orinstalled on the fascia. A change in RF radiation in the vicinity of thefascia exterior may result upon the installation of an unauthorizeddevice. The RF signals can be detected by receiver circuitry, andsignals or data corresponding thereto input to a processor. In someembodiments the circuitry may also determine the frequency of theradiation sensed to be used in resolving if it is within the rangeemitted by legitimate devices such as cell phones of users operating theATM. In other embodiments the circuitry may analyze the signals todetermine if they are varying, and the circuitry and/or the processormay evaluate whether the changes in a signal correspond to the input ofa PIN or a card to the ATM.

In response to the sensed signal data, the processor may operate inaccordance with its programming to evaluate the nature and character ofthe intercepted signals. For example, if the signals do not correspondto a legitimate source, such as a cell phone, the processor may operateto take actions such as to wholly or partially cease operation of theATM, capture images with a camera, and/or notify an appropriate remoteentity through operation of the ATM. Alternatively, the processor maycompare the sensed RF signals to transaction activity at the ATM. If thesensed signals are determined to be varying in ways that correspond in apattern or relationship to card or PIN inputs, for example, theprocessor may operate in accordance with its programming to cause theATM or other devices to take appropriate programmed steps.

In still other exemplary embodiments the processor may be in operativeconnection with an RF emitter. The processor may operate in accordancewith its programming to cause the emitter to generate RF signals thatinterfere with the detected signals. This can be done on a continuingbasis or alternatively only at times during user operation of the ATMwhen user inputs are likely to be intercepted. For example, theprocessor controlling the emitter may operate the ATM or be incommunication with a controller thereof. In such situations, theprocessor may operate to control the emitter to produce outputs at timeswhen a user's card is moving into or out of a card slot, and/or when theATM is accepting a user's PIN or other inputs. Thus, the emitter may beoperative to produce interfering signals during relatively brief periodsso as to not disrupt RF transmissions for an extended period in theevent an incorrect determination is made and the RF signals are from alegitimate source.

In some embodiments an emitter may be a type that transmits on aplurality of frequencies intended to disrupt transmissions within theexpected range of frequencies for a fraud device. In other embodimentsthe emitter may be controlled responsive to the processor to match thefrequency or frequencies of suspect signals that have been detected. Ofcourse these approaches are exemplary of approaches that may be used.

In still some other embodiments the risk of interception of customerinputs to an automated banking machine may be reduced by using types ofinput devices that reduce or eliminate user contact with the machine. Byreducing such user contact the possibilities for interception of userinputs may be reduced. For example in some embodiments the at least onecontroller of the automated banking machine may operate computerexecutable instructions which comprise eye tracking software. Eyetracking software may operate to determine from visible features of theuser's eyes, where the user is looking. This may be done in exemplaryembodiments by having infrared or near infrared emitters directed to anarea of the user's eyes and positioning cameras or other image capturedevices which can detect the reflected radiation from the user's eyes.By having such emitters and image capture devices adjacent to thedisplay of the ATM, the at least one controller in the machine isoperative to determine the area on the display to which the user's eyeor eyes are directed. This can be accomplished for example using eyetracking software available from Tobii Technology of Stockholm, Swedenthat is sold under the trademark My Tobii. Of course this is but one ofmany commercial products that may be used for this purpose.

In exemplary embodiments the at least one controller in the machine maybe operated to receive inputs such as a user's PIN by tracking where anATM user is looking. This may be done in an exemplary embodiment by thecontroller operating to provide output indicia on the display thatinstructs the user to gaze at certain features presented on the display.For example the display may output different colored rectangles in thecorners thereof. The user may be prompted to gaze at each of thespecific rectangles at different times. By detecting the reflectedradiation from the user's eyes as the user looks at each of therectangles, the at least one controller is able to determine where theuser is currently looking.

Thereafter in an exemplary embodiment the user may be prompted to lookat characters or other indicia output on the screen and to select insequence the ones which correspond to the user's PIN by gazing at eachspecific one and then blinking. In this way the user can gaze at theindicia corresponding to each of the characters of the PIN number andselect each character in the proper order by blinking. In someembodiments this may be done by presenting all of the possiblecharacters on a single output screen through the display while in otherembodiments a subset of characters may be output in a plurality ofdifferent display screens. Further in exemplary embodiments the displaymay provide an output such as a star symbol each time that the user issensed by the machine as having selected a character of a PIN number. Ofcourse this is merely an exemplary approach.

In some exemplary embodiments the display may also include indicia suchas a rectangle which a user can gaze at after they have input all of thecharacters of their PIN number. This provides an input to the machine sothat the machine can then operate to attempt to process a transactionusing the characters that the customer has input. In addition in someembodiments the at least one controller may cause the display to outputa rectangle or other indicia that a user can select to reset their PINinputs. Thus for example, if the user happens to involuntarily blink ina manner which causes an erroneous input which does not correspond to acharacter of their PIN, the user can correct the error by resetting theinputs and start over.

In such exemplary embodiments because the movement of the user's eyes isnot perceptible from vantage points that are observable by a thirdparty, it is more difficult to intercept the customer's PIN input.Further in some embodiments even micro cameras which are surreptitiouslymounted on the machine would generally not be effective to enablecriminals to determine the user's PIN inputs based on observation of theuser through the camera.

It should be understood that while this exemplary approach is describedin connection with a user providing a PIN or other secret code to anautomated banking machine, the principles may be used for receivingother inputs from banking machine users. This may include for exampleenabling users to provide transaction instructions to the machine. Suchtransaction instructions may include for example selecting transactiontypes and amounts. This may be accomplished in some embodiments by theat least one controller operating to present different transactionoptions as text in rectangles or other indicia on the screen. The usermay operate to select one of the transaction options by gazing at it andblinking their eyes. Likewise amounts may be selected by presenting arepresentation of the numerical keypad through the display in responseto operation of the controller. The user can then present inputscorresponding to numerical amounts by gazing at selected numerals andthen blinking. Numerous types of inputs may be provided in this manner.

Further it is to be understood that while in this exemplary embodimentthe approach of providing inputs has been discussed as the user gazingat a particular rectangular icon or other indicia on the screen and thenblinking, in other embodiments other approaches may be used. This mayinclude for example the user providing a machine input by looking at aparticular item of indicia on the screen for more than a predeterminedtime so as to select it. Alternatively selections may be made throughother eye movements such as moving the eye in a cross pattern centeredon the particular item of indicia output on the display. Numerousapproaches may be used employing the principles described.

In some exemplary embodiments the ATM 10 is provided with enhanceddiagnostic capabilities as well as the ability for servicers to morereadily perform remedial and preventive maintenance on the machine. Thisis accomplished in an exemplary embodiment by programming the controllerand/or alternatively distributed controllers and processors associatedwith the transaction function devices, to sense and capture diagnosticdata concerning the operation of the various transaction functiondevices. In an exemplary embodiment this diagnostic data may includemore than an indication of a disabling malfunction. In some embodimentsand with regard to some transaction function devices, the data mayinclude for example instances of speed, intensity, deflection, vacuum,force, friction, pressure, sound, vibration, wear or other parametersthat may be of significance for purposes of detecting conditions thatmay be developing with regard to the machine and the transactionfunction devices contained therein. The nature of the diagnostic datathat may be obtained will depend on the particular transaction functiondevices and the capabilities thereof as well as the programming of thecontrollers within the machine.

An exemplary embodiment includes an automated banking machine securityarrangement. The automated banking machine (e.g., ATM) includes a GlobalPositioning System (GPS). An ATM with GPS can include self-servicefeatures enabling a user of the machine to carry out transactions. Aspreviously discussed, an ATM can include a cash dispenser permitting acash withdrawal transaction. As explained in more detail later, GPS (orsome other position indicator) also enables more efficient servicing ofan ATM. Systems and methods related to the monitoring, status, andservicing of ATMs may be found in U.S. Pat. No. 5,984,178, the entiredisclosure of which is herein incorporated by reference.

An ATM (or each ATM in a network of ATMs) can be embedded with a GPStransceiver. The operation of a GPS is well known and need not bediscussed in detail herein. An ATM's GPS module or unit can identify thegeographical position of the ATM by using a coordinate system. Forexample, the GPS unit can read its latitude and longitude coordinateswith the use of one or more satellites. An ATM with GPS technologyallows the ATM to annunciate its location. The ATM can emit itscoordinates through a variety of known communication mechanisms.

In an exemplary arrangement, an ATM is provided with GPS to permittracking of the ATM. The tracking can be beneficial in maintainingaccurate location information on a plurality of ATMs, especially ifcertain ATMs are moved during their lifetime. As explained in moredetail herein, tracking can also be used to thwart thieves who are ableto pickup and remove an entire ATM unit.

A GPS unit (including an antenna) can be built into an ATM so that theGPS cannot be dismantled. The GPS can be connected with an ATM in amanner ensuring that the ATM's positional information (i.e.,coordinates) can continue to be conveyed. For example, criticalcomponents of the GPS (and ATM) can be battery backed to enableconveyance of the unit's position. This arrangement permits a GPSdisconnected from its main power source to still have the ability toaccurately obtain from one or more satellites the ATM position. The GPSunit may comprise a satellite phone.

An ATM computer or controller can request a reading of location datafrom the GPS unit. It should be understood that for purposes of brevity,herein a “computer” may comprise one or more computers or processors,whether in a single device or distributed among several devices. The GPSunit can obtain the ATM position coordinates from one or moresatellites. The ATM computer can receive the location data from the GPSunit. The ATM can transmit its UPS-obtained position to a servicemonitoring (or responsible for) the security of the ATM. The securitymonitoring service center may oversee the monitoring of pluralGPS-equipped ATMs. Communication between an ATM and the security center(which may be the ATM's host) can be carried out in a known manner ofcommunication, including the use of a phone line, a proprietary line, awireless system, a satellite system, a network, an intranet, and/or theInternet. Critical components in the ATM can also be battery backed toensure communication with the GPS unit and the security center. Acomputer software program operating at the security center (or in theATM) can be used to determine if the normally stationary (or fixed) ATMterminal has been improperly moved.

FIG. 16 shows a shared security/monitoring arrangement 300 for pluralATMs. The arrangement 300 includes a satellite 302, ATMs 304, 306, 308with respective GPS units 310, 312, 314, and a security/monitoringcenter 316. As previously discussed, the ATMs 304, 306, 308 can obtain aGPS reading via the satellite 302 and then transmit the read data to thesecurity center 316. For example, a GPS reading may be obtained with asatellite phone which is able to transmit the GPS data to a web siteaccessible by the security center computer. The security center 316 caninclude many different types of communication devices, including a cellphone system 318.

A stolen ATM having GPS technology enables movement of the stolen ATM tobe tracked. One or more computers operating in conjunction with asecurity center enable the current position of a moving ATM to betracked in real time. Software operating in a security center computercan be used to present the individual GPS-reported ATM positions as asimultaneous path of travel. The software can overlay the travel path ofa stolen ATM onto a road map of the surrounding area. Authorities can bekept informed as to the route of the tracked ATM. The real time overlaymap can also be downloaded (e.g., via the Internet) from the securitycenter to the authorities (e.g., police). The monitoring arrangementpermits a stolen ATM with GPS to be recovered.

The security center can be in operative connection with a databasecontaining the locations of respective ATMs stored in memory. Thesecurity center can use a computer (e.g., a host computer) to compare areceived ATM GPS location to the stored location assigned to thatparticular ATM. If the compared locations do not substantially match,then the computer can determine that the ATM was stolen and, responsivethereto, cause proper action to be initiated. The comparison may includea predetermined percentage error range to compensate for GPS readingcalibrations, fluctuations, deviations, and other factors. AdditionalGPS location data readings and location comparisons may be performed toensure accuracy before a final determination on theft is made.

FIG. 17 shows steps in a process of comparing read GPS location data tostored ATM location data. Location data for a plurality of ATMs (i.e.,ATM #1 to ATM #N) is stored in a database 320. Stored data 322 includeslocation data corresponding to the fixed or assigned location of ATM #1(e.g., ATM 304). Stored data 324 includes location data corresponding tothe fixed location of ATM #2 (e.g., ATM 306). GPS data 326 was obtainedusing the GPS unit of ATM #1. The location data in the stored data 322for ATM #1 is compared to the GPS location data 326 for ATM #1 by usinga computer 328, which may be in the security center 316. If thecomparison results in a corresponding “Yes” match, then ATM #1 isdetermined as secure 330.

However, if the comparison does not result in a corresponding match,then the security status of ATM #1 is determined as stolen. Following a“No” match, at least one of the response actions 332, 334, 336, 338 canbe executed, as explained in more detail later. That is, response to adetermination of theft one or more actions can be initiated, includingnotifying 332 the authorities about the theft, firing 334 dye packslocated in the stolen ATM, tripping 336 an alarm in the stolen ATM,and/or tracking 338 movement of the stolen ATM. It should be understoodthat a security center 316 can include the database 320 and the computer328, and cause commencing of the actions 332, 334, 336, 338.Alternatively, the database 320 can be remotely located from thesecurity center 316, yet in operative connection therewith to enable thesecurity center to request and receive location data from the database(and store data in the database).

The GPS location analysis performed by the security center 316 for aparticular ATM can be used to cause the firing of dye packs in thatparticular ATM. FIG. 18 shows the ATM 304 including a secure chest orsafe portion 340. The ATM chest 340 includes a dye pack 342 adjacent tocash 344 in a currency dispenser 346. The cash 344 may be in a currencycassette in the currency dispenser 346. The ATM chest 340 also includesa dye pack 348 adjacent to cash 350 in a cash deposit bin 352. The cashdeposit bin 352 can hold cash that was deposited by ATM users or cashthat was not taken following a cash withdrawal transaction. The GPStransceiver 310 and an ATM computer 354 are also shown. The ATM computer354 can cause firing of the dye packs 342, 348. The ATM computer 354 canbe instructed by the security center 316 to fire the dye packs 342, 348.The ATM 304 further includes movement sensors 360, 362. Although the GPSunit 310 and the ATM computer 354 are shown in the upper portion 356 ofthe ATM housing 358, it should be understood that they may be situatedinside of the secure chest portion 340 of the ATM housing (e.g., likeGPS unit 314).

Different communication methods can be used in carrying out thedetermination of whether an ATM was stolen. In one arrangement the ATMcomputer 354 can periodically obtain a regularly time-based locationreading from the GPS unit 310 (i.e., predetermined reading times). Inanother arrangement the ATM computer 354 can continuously receiveupdated GPS data from the GPS unit 310. The ATM 304 (or the GPS unit310) can transmit the read GPS location information to the securitycenter 316. The security center 316 analyzes the transmitted GPSlocation information (e.g., by performing the previously discussedlocation comparisons) to determine if inappropriate movement (e.g.,theft) involving the ATM 304 has occurred. As previously discussed,response actions 332, 334, 336, 338 can also be initiated via thesecurity center 316.

In another arrangement the ATM 304 can use the sensors 360, 362 (e.g.,motion detectors) to detect movement (e.g., tilt, lateral, vertical,and/or horizontal movement) of the ATM 304. The ATM computer 354 is inoperative connection with the sensors 360, 362 to receive informationtherefrom. In response to a sensed ATM movement, the ATM computer 354can take action to thwart the suspected theft of the ATM 304. Forexample, the ATM computer 354 can cause the dye packs 342, 348 to befired. The ATM computer 354 may notify the security center 316 of thesensed ATM movement. As previously discussed, the security center 316can initiate response actions 332, 334, 336, 338 to thwart the suspectedtheft of the ATM.

Alternatively, an analysis of GPS location information can be used toverify whether or not the sensed ATM movement was the result of the ATM304 being illegally moved from its expected location or because of someother disturbance (e.g., an earthquake). In response to a sensor 360,362 detecting movement of the ATM 304, the ATM computer 354 can requesta location reading from the GPS unit 310. The ATM 304 transmits theacquired GPS location data 326 to the computer 328 associated with thesecurity center 316. Again, the security center 316 can compare (aspreviously discussed) the GPS location data 326 to stored location data372 to determine whether the particular ATM 304 (i.e., ATM #1) wasactually moved from its foundation. Thus, both movement sensors 360, 362and GPS 310 can be used together to accurately determine whether or notan ATM 304 was stolen.

In a further arrangement the plurality of ATMs 304, 306, 308 eachinclude a wireless cell phone. FIG. 18 shows the ATM 304 including acell phone system 366. The ATM computer 354 is in operative connectionwith the cell phone 366. Each ATM can use their cell phone to call thesecurity center 316, which includes the cell phone system 318. Each ATMis also operative to receive calls from the security center 316. Thesecurity center cell phone system 318 is operative to simultaneouslycommunicate with plural ATMs via their cell phones.

The security center 316 is in operative connection with a databasehaving memory for storage of cell calling area information correspondingto each respective ATM cell phone. The stored cell calling areainformation can be in previously discussed database 320 or it can be ina separate cell database. FIG. 19 depicts an expanded portion of thedatabase 320 showing additional ATM information. The previouslydiscussed stored data 322 corresponding to ATM #1 is also depicted. ForATM #1 the identity data 370 is stored in corresponding relationshipwith the ATM's location data 372, cell phone number data 374, and callcell data 376. The database 320 enables the identity 370 of an ATM to beascertained via its stored location data 372 or by its stored cell phonenumber data 374. Likewise, an ATM location 372 can be identified via itscell phone number 374, and vice versa. That is, in the database 320 eachATM cell phone number is also stored in corresponding relationship witha respective cell calling area. For example, phone number data 374 isstored in relation with cell data 376.

The cell assigned to an ATM can be the call cell in which that ATM isphysically located. That is, the assigned cell can be the cell in whichthe cell phone (of the fixed ATM) would use to originate a phone call.The stored location data for a particular ATM can be used to determinewhich cell is to be assigned to the phone number for that particularATM. That is, the assigned cell can be based on the stored (andassigned) location. For example, the cell calling area which covers thelocation 372 of ATM #1 can be used as the cell 376 assigned to ATM #1.Using the stored location data enables the database to be quicklyupdated to reflect any changes in cell areas, cell providers, etc.

It should be understood that some ATMs may be located in the same cellcalling area. Thus, these ATMs could be assigned the same cell data inthe database 320. For example, both ATM #1 and ATM #3 could have thesame stored cell data. Contrarily, a cell in the database may beassigned to only a single cell phone number because the phone numberbelongs to an isolated distant ATM. For example, the cell data assignedto ATM #2 may be the only instance of that cell in the entire database320.

An exemplary security checking operation involving the cell phonearrangement will now be discussed. An ATM computer 354 causes the ATM'scell phone 366 to periodically call the security center cell phonesystem 318. The security center 316 uses the computer 328 (or anothercomputer) to perform an initial analysis of the received call. In anexemplary embodiment of first level security analysis, the securitycenter 316 can recognize which ATM cell phone placed the call, such asby using caller ID, etc. The security center 316 can use thisinformation to learn the cell assigned to the ATM from which the callwas made. For example, the security center 316 can use caller ID toascertain the phone number 374 belonging to a call originating from thephone of the not yet identified ATM. By knowing the phone number 374 thesecurity center 316 can use the database 320 to identify the ATM as ATM#1. The security center 316 can further use the database 320 todetermine the cell 376 assigned to ATM #1. Thus, the assigned cell 376is known.

Next, the security center 316 needs to compare the assigned cell 376 tothe used cell. The security center 316 can obtain the cell used by theATM phone. Triangulation calculations or secondary sources may be usedin obtaining the cell in which the call was made. The security centercomputer 328 can then compare the obtained cell to the cell 376 assignedto that particular ATM 370. If the compared cells do not match, then itis determined that the cell phone of ATM #1 was moved out of itsassigned cell area 376. The security level for ATM #1 can be flagged assuspect. Thus, the theft of ATM #1 can be viewed as suspect. In thefirst level of security analysis, improper movement of a particular ATMcan be suspected via the ATM's cell phone, without using the ATM's GPSunit. Although ATM #1 was used in the example, it should be understoodthat a first analysis can be applied to any of the ATMs in the ATMnetwork.

Returning to the exemplary example, following a suspicion of theft ofATM #1, the security center 316 can initiate appropriate responseactions 332, 334, 336, 338 to thwart the suspected theft, as previouslydiscussed. Alternatively, in response to the suspicion, the securitycenter 316 can begin another (second) level of security analysis on ATM#1. That is, a second analysis can be performed before a response action332, 334, 336, 338 is initiated by the security center 316. The secondanalysis can be performed to double check or validate the suspicion oftheft of ATM #1. The second analysis can be independent from the firstanalysis. The second analysis can use the GPS unit of ATM #1.

In an exemplary embodiment of second level security analysis, thesecurity center 316 submits a request to the suspect ATM #1 asking foran updated GPS reading. The request can be communicated in a mannerpreviously discussed, including using cell phone communication. In amanner previously discussed, an ATM computer 354 attempts to obtain anupdated reading with its GPS unit 310, and then transmit the updatedreading to the security center 316. The security center 316 can thencompare (as previously discussed) the updated GPS location data 326 todatabase location data 372 corresponding to the suspect ATM #1. Based onthe location comparison, the security center 316 can determine whetherthe suspected theft activity was founded. If an updated GPS reading isno longer obtainable then this information can also be a factor in thedetermination. Once a determination is made that the ATM was actuallyillegally moved (i.e., stolen), then responsive actions such asnotifying authorities 332, firing dye packs 334, starting an alarm 336,and/or ATM tracking 338 can be initiated to thwart the theft.

In other security arrangements, the ATM does not have to rely on asecurity center to perform a determination of ATM movement. In anexemplary embodiment the ATM's own computer can make the determination.

An ATM computer can have a backup battery power source. Battery sourcesfor computers are known in the art. An ATM computer 354 can have accessto location data locally stored in the ATM. For example, the ATM data322 can be stored in ATM #1 or in a security software program operatingin ATM #1. The location data 372 for ATM #1 may have been previouslydownloaded to ATM #1 for storage therein. Thus, the ATM #1 computer 354itself (instead of the security center) can run a security computerprogram to perform a comparison of the ATM's assigned location 372 tothe location obtained from the ATM's GPS reading 326. If the ATMcomputer 354 determines that the locations 372, 326 do not match, thenthe ATM computer 354 can cause an ATM alarm to trip and/or notify thesecurity center (or other authorities) regarding the theft of the ATM.Again, the security center can cause appropriate response actions 332,334, 336, 338 to be carried out.

In another security arrangement, motion sensors, GPS, and a cell phone(or cell phone modem) can be used in combination to analyze the statusof an ATM. For example, an ATM GPS unit can periodically or continuouslyreceive position readings. The GPS unit and cell phone are in operativeconnection so that the cell phone can receive GPS data from the GPS unit(even when the cell phone is in an “off” or sleep condition). Detectedmotion of the ATM (via a motion sensor) causes the cell phone to beplaced in an “on” or awakened condition (i.e., turned on). The cellphone when turned on is programmed to transmit GPS data to a satellite.The satellite can receive the transmitted data and recognize the datasender (i.e., the cell phone/ATM). The satellite can then send the GPSinformation and sender data to a web site that allows monitoring of theATM's location. That is, the web site can be accessible by a securitycenter computer.

It should be understood that various alternative combinations may beused in the exemplary embodiments. For example, a cell phone can beprogrammed to receive and transmit the GPS data. A cell phone caninclude the GPS system. Also, while motion is detected, a cell phone canbe periodically turned on (e.g., every minute) to receive and/ortransmit the GPS data. When movement of the ATM stops, so do thetransmissions. Furthermore, the cell phone can bypass the satellite tosend the GPS information (and cell phone/ATM ID data) directly to theweb site (or a database). A computer may link the GPS unit and the cellphone. Alternatively, a GPS satellite phone may be used.

An ATM's alarm can be tripped responsive to reading GPS data. The alarmcan also have a backup battery power source. An alarm controller in theATM can activate the alarm in response to the ATM's security computerprogram determining movement of the ATM via the GPS reading (and/or viaone or more movement sensors). The alarm can be audible or silent. Asilent alarm can notify a security center or authorities. An audiblealarm can have different decibel levels. A higher decibel level, whichis uncomfortable to a thief operating the getaway vehicle, may be usedwhile ATM movement is detected. The alarm can be switched to a lowerdecibel level when ATM movement is no longer detected, or vice versa.Hence, an ATM can have a plural stage audible alarm. Furthermore, knownfunctions for drawing attention to a stolen ATM or cash may additionallybe used. For example, the GPS can also be associated with tripping acash staining device (e.g., dye packs) located in the ATM.

In a further exemplary embodiment, even if an ATM 304 is stolen, thecash in its chest portion 340 (or safe) can be rendered useless to thethieves. The security system in the ATM can also monitor the sequencethat was used to open the ATM's chest 340. The security system, whichcan include the computer 354 and a software program operable in thecomputer, can recognize a normal (or permitted) chest opening sequence.The security system can also detect a non-normal (or non-authorized)chest opening sequence. If the chest is not opened in the propersequence, then the security system can act to have cash 344, 350 insidethe chest 340 marked in a manner indicative of stolen cash (e.g.,stained/dyed cash).

The software can be programmed to monitor chest opening sequences.Alternatively, the software can be programmed to initiate monitoring ofa chest opening sequence following a detection of suspicious (orconfirmed) ATM movement.

An example of a normal sequence for accessing the cash in the chest willnow be discussed. The predetermined chest door opening sequence caninclude a plurality of sequence events. In the example, the ATM is firstput into a maintenance mode. Next an unlocking of the chest door occurs.This may include entering one or more correct combinations. Next thechest door handle is turned to cause an interior lock bolt to move tounlock the chest door. Then the chest door is pivoted or swung to anopen position to provide access to the chest interior. It should beunderstood that the opening of the chest door may be one of the sequenceevents. The performing of certain steps in the sequence can be aprerequisite for later steps.

Sensors can detect whether a predetermined (normal) sequence portion wascarried out. The sensors can be in operative connection with thesecurity system computer to provide feedback to the computer. Again, thesecurity system, including the computer and sensors, can operate with abackup power source, such as one or more batteries.

The computer can be informed or recognize when the ATM status conditionis in maintenance mode. Sensors can be used to detect when unlocking ofthe chest door occurs. The entering of mechanical or electroniccombinations can be sensed. Sensors can detect when the chest doorhandle is turned. Sensors can be positioned adjacent to the handle todetect movement of the handle. Motion sensors can be positioned adjacentto the lock bolt work components which (in the predetermined sequence)would need to move to permit opening of the chest door. Other sensorscan be used to detect when the chest door was moved from a closedposition to an open position. An example of a lock bolt work arrangementfor an automated banking machine may be found in U.S. Pat. No.5,784,973, the entire disclosure of which is herein incorporated byreference.

The software operated by the security system computer can analyze thesensor input to determine if any events or steps in the normal chestdoor opening sequence have been bypassed. The software can compare thesensed (performed) sequence events to the stored (expected)predetermined sequence steps. For example, the ATM computer can monitorand track sequence event occurrence. Responsive to the monitoring, thecomputer can determine whether all expected sequence events haveoccurred. The computer can assign a condition (e.g., positive ornegative) to the chest door opening status. Therefore, when opening ofthe chest door is detected, the computer can conclude whether to firethe dye packs.

In a non-normal chest opening sequence the chest door was opened, butnot in the expected sequence. For example, the chest door (or otherchest components) may have been drilled or burnt to enable the chestdoor to be opened for accessing the cash. The exemplary ATM securitysystem can detect if a chest bolt was unlocked without the chest doorlock first being unlocked (or other optional prerequisite steps, e.g.,maintenance mode, combination, code access, etc.). For example, thesecurity system can detect whether the door combination was notcorrectly (or ever) entered, yet the chest's interior bolt was moved toan unlocked position. The security system can also detect whether thechest door was opened without turning of the door handle. The securitysystem can make a determination that unauthorized access was granted tothe chest interior responsive to the door being opened (or in anunlocked position enabling opening thereof) out of sequence. Thedetection of a non normal chest door opening sequence (or order) can beinterpreted as an attack against the chest (and any cash therein).

In response to a determination of an attack against the chest, the cash344, 350 inside the chest 340 can be devalued by the security system.The chest 340 includes a chest door, such as previously discussed chestdoor 18. The chest door in an open position enables a service person toaccess devices and components in the security chest interior. Thesecurity system includes a currency staining system, and a method ofactuating the staining system. For example, the security system caninclude dye packs 342, 348. The dye packs 342, 348 can be located in thechest 340 adjacent to the cash 344, 350. The security system can causethe dye packs 342, 348 to be activated (e.g., fired or exploded) torelease the dye therefrom.

The security software operating in the ATM computer 354 can beprogrammed to cause the computer 354 to initiate firing of the dye packs342, 348 in response to a determination that the door of the chest 340was opened (or moved) without following (or completion of) a requiredsequence (or pattern) for opening the chest door. That is, dye packs canbe triggered to fire upon unauthorized movement of the chest door. Thecomputer programming software in the security system can be read by thecomputer 354 to determine unauthorized chest access and initiate anelectronic firing of the dye packs.

The ATM security system computer may determine that the door openingsequence is improper prior to the chest door being opened. Thus, thecomputer may be programmed to automatically fire the dye packs when thechest door is still closed but is detected as being placed in anunlocked condition. In other programming embodiments firing of the dyepacks may not occur until the chest door is actually opened. Forexample, the computer may not determine an improper sequence until thechest door was actually opened.

In alternative embodiments the computer can issue a warning of adetected improper chest opening sequence. Such a warning can be audibleor visible (e.g., a display message, etc.). The warning may be presentedin a manner that is undetectable (silent) to the public, but detectableto an authorized service person. The warning may be presented as aflashing light at the rear of the ATM. The warning may be presented viaa cell phone call to a specific number at a security center. The warningmay be beneficial to an authorized service person who inadvertentlygenerated an out-of-sequence step. A code can be inputted to the ATM tooverride or reset the out-of-sequence programming, or disable firing ofthe dye packs. Entry of the code may be time based. For example, if thecode is not entered within a predetermine time period, then override isno longer a valid option.

Dye released from a dye pack 342, 348 is operative to deface cash (i.e.,currency or money or notes or bills) in a known manner. The size andamount of dye packs and their placement relative to cash in an ATM chestcan be strategically predetermined to ensure optimum devaluing of allthe cash in the chest upon activation of the dye packs.

New ATMs can be provided with the sequence monitoring security system.Existing ATMs can be retrofit with the security system. Because thesequence monitoring security system can be provided in some ATMs withoutneeding any additional sensors or alarm grids, it can be easy to providea low-cost retrofit. The sequence monitoring security system may beprovided as a backup to normal anti-theft detection arrangements forATMs.

As previously discussed, an ATM computer can cause dye packs to befired, such as in response to a security software program detecting animproper chest opening sequence. That is, an ATM computer can controloperation of the ATM dye packs. As previously discussed, an ATM computercan also communicate with the security center computer. Thus, thesecurity center can directly communicate instructions to the ATMcomputer, including instructions for the ATM computer to fire the dyepacks. That is, regardless of the monitored security status of a chestopening sequence, an ATM computer can be instructed by a security centerto activate the dye packs at any time. Thus, dye pack activation can beindependent of chest opening sequence monitoring.

As previously discussed, dye pack activation can be a response action334 to ATM theft. A security center 316 can use ATM GPS information 326to confirm that an ATM was stolen. Responsive to the confirmation oftheft, the security center 316 can instruct the ATM computer 354 toactuate its dye packs 344, 348. Upon the ATM computer 354 receiving theinstruction to fire the dye packs 344, 348, the ATM computer can causethe dye packs to be exploded to stain the cash 344, 350 located withinthe interior of its chest 340. Thus, the staining of money inside of anATM can be the result of a positional reading taken with a GPS unit ofthat ATM.

In another exemplary arrangement, the security center itself candirectly signal ATM dye packs to fire. That is, the security center canfire the dye packs without using the ATM computer. The security centermay cause the dye packs to be activated following a theft confirmation.The signal from the security center to a dye pack may be encrypted. Adye pack can have a trigger device (or a detonator) set to fire uponreceiving a predetermined frequency or wave. A radio frequency may beused. The frequency can be unique to a particular dye pack or a seriesof dye packs in a particular ATM. The security center can generate andtransmit the frequency. Alternatively, if the security center is too farfrom the ATM, then the security center can cause the ATM (or anothernearby source) to initiate or generate the triggering frequency.

It should be understood that the scope of the described concepts fordetermining whether an automated banking machine was moved is notlimited to the embodiments disclosed herein. For example, imagerecognition, land-based radar, and sound waves can also be used indetermining whether an ATM was stolen. A camera unit can be fixedlymounted to periodically capture an image of an ATM. The camera unit cantransmit the image to a security center. The security center can have anoriginal image of the ATM stored in a database. The security center canuse image recognition software to compare the image received from thecamera unit to the image in storage. Likewise, data relating to landbased radar and/or sound waves can be used in determination comparisons.If compared data does not match, then an appropriate response action canbe initiated by the ATM, as previously discussed. Alternatively, one ormore additional analyses may be performed to confirm that the ATM wasactually stolen. The confirmation analyses may include securitycomparisons already discussed, including comparisons involving datarelated to movement sensors, phone cells, and/or ATM GPS.

An ATM may need servicing (e.g., transaction function devicemalfunction, cash replenishment, low paper supply, predeterminedmaintenance, etc.) An ATM with GPS provides a service center (which maycomprise the security center) the ability to identify the closestservice personnel to the ATM. A dispatching program can operate in aservice center computer (or an ATM host computer). The service centercan receive both GPS information and a service request from an ATM. TheGPS information and service request may be received in the sametransmission packet. The service center can also receive (e.g., via GPS,address input, phone, voice, etc.) the current (or latest) locations ofservice personnel in the field. The dispatching program can determinewhich available service person can reach the ATM needing service thequickest. The program can match service personnel to service-needingATMs for optimum efficiency.

The dispatching program can also use received ATM GPS information togenerate optimal directions for the chosen service person to use toreach the ATM. The directions can include the most efficient route. Thedirections can be transmitted to the service person in a known manner.The dispatching program can also operate in real time with regard tocurrent traffic conditions that may influence the route decisions, andhence the servicer-to-ATM matching. Thus, the chosen servicer may notnecessarily be the closest servicer in distance. In an exemplaryembodiment, the servicer is chosen based on smallest estimated traveltime. The use of ATM GPS allows a servicer to reach an ATM in thequickest manner. The ability to quickly associate the position of an ATMneeding servicing with the current positions of available servicepersonnel results in a more efficient service dispatch. ATM operatingefficiency can be improved.

In other exemplary embodiments, an ATM can signal what type of servicingis needed. Thus, a servicer may be chosen based on smallest estimatedtravel time in conjunction with the needed skill level of the serviceperson.

It should be understood that the use of GPS for servicing applies toboth fixed and portable (or movable) ATMs. For example, a portable ATMmay be built into a vehicle that is able to drive to different sportingevents, entertainment venues, etc. The portable ATM can be used (e.g.,cash withdrawal transactions, etc.) by users at the events. Again, theability to use GPS to quickly analyze or compare the current position ofa portable ATM with the current positions of available service personnelresults in a more efficient service dispatch.

The previously discussed use of GPS enables an ATM to be installed atany location just by plugging it in. Thus, in alternative embodimentsthere is no need to keep a database on where ATMs are located, becauseGPS tracking keeps the security/service center aware of their location,especially for purposes of servicing. A dynamic database of machinelocations can be established and automatically updated.

The ability to locate a machine's geographical position can also be usedto enhance the usage security of other automated transaction machines(e.g., ATMs). An exemplary embodiment combines the signals of a GPSsystem with a cellular device (e.g., cell phone) to provide informationrelated to the geographical location of the cellular device user. Thatis, the exemplary embodiment includes the ability to track cellulardevices using a combination of cellular or GPS/cellular technology. Acellular device can be equipped with a GPS receiver and/or transmitter.

For purposes of this disclosure a cell phone shall be deemed to includea cell phone, PDA, pager or other device that has audio and/or textcommunication capabilities. It should be understood that although a cellphone is used as the cellular device (or cellular object) in someexemplary embodiments herein, other cellular devices can likewise beused. That is, a cellular device need not be limited to a phone. Forexample, an object such as a card, key, time piece, wallet, vehicle,human body, etc. may have cellular technology (and/or GPS technology)embedded therein or thereon which allows the location of the object tobe ascertained. Cell triangulation is one method to remotely determinethe current location of a cellular object. Likewise, GPS communicationis one method to remotely determine the current location of an objecthaving GPS technology (e.g., GPS transmitter and/or receiver).

An exemplary cellular embodiment includes the ability to obtain thegeographical location of an automated banking machine (e.g., ATM). Aspreviously discussed, an ATM location can be obtained via an embeddedGPS device in the ATM or a database of ATM installation locations. Thus,an ATM user's cell phone location can be compared with the ATM locationto determine if the user is an authorized user.

The arrangement can be operated independently or as part of a fraudprevention (or security) service to which an ATM cardholder can join. Amember in the fraud prevention program grants permission for his cellphone's location to be known to the provider of the security servicewhenever his account (or one of his accounts) is accessed at an ATM. Themember provides to the service provider the information (e.g., cellphone number, cell phone provider, contact options, etc.) necessary toset up the service. The service provider program can be provided by apartnership between a financial institution (e.g., bank), a transactionprocessor host, and one or more cell service providers. Alternatively,the program can be controlled by a sole proprietor.

Different types of member-selectable contact options are available. Forexample, the program can be set up to alert a member about a transactionthat is being requested on his/her account from an ATM which is notwithin reasonable proximity to his/her cell phone. The service providernotifies the member via the member's cell phone that a transaction isbeing requested at a particular ATM. Another selectable option caninclude having the service provider prevent a transaction request frombeing carried out when the ATM location and the member's cell phonelocation do not substantially correspond.

An exemplary method of operation of a fraud prevention service will nowbe explained with reference to FIG. 22. As shown, the exemplary systemarrangement 400 includes ATMs 402, 404, 406, an ATM host 410 incommunication with the ATMs, a cell phone locator system 412 incommunication with the host, and a member's cell phone 408.

An ATM 402 receives user identification data from a customer. Theidentification data may be received during a transaction request. Theidentification can be in the form of a name, account number, PIN, code,password, data sequence, biometric data, or some other informationlinking a person to an account. The identification can be input orprovided by the customer to the ATM 402, such as from a card or abiometric type of input (iris scan, fingerprint, etc.). For purposes ofthis disclosure card data includes data read from a card or other objectthrough operation of the machine that can be used to determine acorresponding financial account. Alternatively, the identification maybe determined from some other customer input or a customer item read bythe ATM 402.

The ATM 402 sends the user identification data to a computer of the host410. The host computer can be part of a host system for an ATM network.Each of the ATMs is in communication with the host. In some embodimentsthe host 410 can communicate with other computers outside of the ATMnetwork in carrying out a transaction.

The host 410 can operate to determine the ATM location from a GPS devicein the ATM 402. Alternatively the host 410 can determine the ATMlocation from one or more databases 414 that includes the locations ofthe ATMs in the network. The host has access to the database 414. TheATM can provide its ATM ID to the host during communication with thehost. For example, the ATM ID can be sent to the host when the useridentification data is sent to the host 410. The host can compare an ATMID to ATM IDs in the database to ascertain the location of an ATM. Inother arrangements, data obtained by the host via a GPS device in an ATMmay first need to be compared with a database to ascertain the locationof the ATM.

The host 410 can also determine the cell phone 408 assigned to thereceived user identification data. The database 414 links authorized ATMusers to their cell phones (and their accounts). For example, the hostcan compare received (or determined) account data to account data in thedatabase 414 to ascertain the cell phone assigned to that account.

The host 410 is in operative communication with a cell phone locatorsystem 412. In some embodiments the cell phone locator system maycomprise a separate computer or computers and other hardware that isoperative to determine cell phone location, while in other embodimentsthe cell phone locator system may comprise software instructionsoperative in one or more computers that operate in conjunction withother functions and determine cell phone location through communicationwith other devices or systems. The host can request the cell phonelocator system 412 to provide the location of the cell phone 408corresponding to the user. The host can provide the cell phone locatorwith a cell phone number, a cell phone account number, or otherinformation corresponding to the ascertained cell phone.

The cell phone locator system 412 receives the host request anddetermines the current location of the cell phone 408. The cell phonelocator can use cell triangulation to determine the current location ofthe cell phone. Alternatively, the cell phone locator can use a GPSdevice in the cell phone to determine the location of the cell phone.For example, the cell phone may receive a request from the cell phonelocator to report its location. In response to the request, the cellphone can find its location (or GPS coordinates) using its GPS receiver.The cell phone then communicates the location data to the cell phonelocator using cellular technology. Alternatively, the cell phone maytransmit its location to the cell phone locator system using (viasatellite) GPS technology. Thus, the cell phone locator system 412 knowsthe location (or GPS coordinates) of the cell phone.

The host 410 receives the location of the cell phone from cell phonelocator system 412. Alternatively, the host can receive the location ofthe cell phone directly from the cell phone. The host can then comparethe cell phone's location to the ATM's location. If the locationscorrespond, then the received user identification data is authenticated.The current ATM customer (adjacent to the ATM) is determined as anauthorized user of the account. The transaction request is approved.

If the locations do not correspond, then the host may operate inaccordance with its programming so that the current ATM customer isdenied the ability to perform transactions with that account(corresponding to the received identification data). That is, atransaction request (and/or use of the ATM) would be denied. Thesecurity arrangement prevents an unauthorized ATM user (i.e., a thief)from using an ATM card that was stolen from a service member, to performa transaction at the ATM involving the member's financial account. Thus,even if a member's ATM card and PIN are stolen by a thief, the fraudprevention service can still prevent unauthorized ATM access to funds inthe member's bank account. Because of the additional cell phone securityfeature, the thief's use of the ATM would be limited (e.g., card entry,PIN entry, etc.), and would not include theft of the member's money.

It should be understood that cell phone and ATM locations are deemed tocorrespond through operation of the system based on predeterminedvariables. Particular variables can be assigned to particular users ofthe fraud prevention service. For example, one correspondence mayrequire that the compared locations be within a predetermined degree ordistance from each other. In another acceptable correspondencearrangement, the ATM location may have to be physically located withinthe same cell as the cell phone. Correspondence may also be timesensitive. For example, a member of the fraud prevention service canhave their account set up such that ATM usage is only permitted duringspecific times of specific days. Thus, time can be another factor (orvariable) that may have to be met (along with correspondence betweencell phone location and ATM location) before a transaction isauthorized. In still other arrangements, time can be chosen by a memberas the only variable. For example, a member who only needs limitedaccess to an ATM may select their ATM access time period as limited to9-10 a.m. on Saturday mornings. Any (fraudulent) attempt to access thisperson's account at an ATM outside of this designated time period wouldbe denied. The fraud prevention system is flexible and enables users toselect and/or change their assigned variables to meet their particularneeds and safety concerns. This may be done for example by the userestablishing the parameters through correspondence with their financialinstitution when they establish the service. Alternatively or inaddition the user may establish and/or change their desired usageparameters through communication with the bank in connection with anonline banking system. Thus, for example, users who have the onlinebanking service and the associated secure communications associatedtherewith may be given the option to modify their ATM usage parametersthrough an online interface which thereafter operates to cause theparameters for authorized transactions to be changed. Alternatively orin addition ATMs may include programming which enables a user once theyhave established their authority to operate the machine to thereafterchange or modify certain user parameters through inputs through the ATMinterface. Of course these approaches are exemplary and in otherembodiments other approaches may be used.

An exemplary system for fraud prevention will now be explained. A personuses an ATM to request a financial transaction, such as a cashwithdrawal transaction request for $100 from a checking account. Therequest (along with other information) is transmitted from the ATM tothe transaction processor host (which may be the host computer for theATM network). As previously discussed, the host knows or can determinethe location of the ATM from which the transaction request is beingmade. The host also knows that the transaction request is from aparticular individual due to the identification (e.g., an account numberon a card) provided to the ATM during the request.

The host analyzes database records corresponding to that particularindividual. The host can determine through execution of its programmedinstructions whether the individual is a member of the fraud preventionprogram. If so, then the host also determines the member's cell phoneprovider. This is done by accessing stored data in at least one datastore. The host requests the current location of the member's cell phonefrom the cell phone provider (or a phone location server associatedtherewith). The cell phone provider computer or computers determines thecurrent location of the member's cell phone and then transmits messagesincluding data corresponding to that location back to the host. The hostcompares the received cell phone location to the ATM location. If thetwo locations are within a predetermined range or proximity of oneanother then the transaction requested is determined safe and can beauthorized according to normal transaction authorization rules in place.However, if the two locations do not correspond or are not within thepredetermined acceptable proximity, then appropriate fraud notificationrules and procedures can be implemented.

Thus, grant/denial of an ATM transaction request involving a member'saccount can be based on that member's location. If it is concluded thatthe member is adjacent the ATM, then the transaction request is granted.Otherwise the transaction request is denied. The member's determinedlocation (via the member's cell phone location) can be used as another(or secondary) source of user identification.

A variety of additional fraud notification rules can be defined(selected) by the member, such as at the time of service protectionenrollment. In a first example, if a member (e.g., a female) has soleaccess to her account and she normally has the cell phone with her, thenshe may have selected an option in which the service provider (e.g.,bank or host operating on behalf) denies any transaction request wherethere is a mismatch between the ATM location and her cell phonelocation. With this selected option the member's cell phone may receivefrom the service provider a text message like “A transaction was justattempted against your account, but was denied due to locationdiscrepancies between the ATM in question and your cell phone. Pleasecontact us at . . . for more information.”

In the first example, an ATM may be instructed by a host to capture theinserted card responsive to a determined mismatch of locations. Further,the host itself may be programmed to notify the police of a potentialtheft in progress at the particular ATM. This may be done for examplethrough an automated voice response interface that operates to cause asynthesized voice message to the police in the jurisdiction where thetransaction is being attempted. Alternatively or in addition textmessages, e-mail, radio or other types of transmission messages tocommunicate with appropriate authorities may be used.

In a second example, a member (e.g., a male) may share access to anaccount (such as with a spouse) and it can sometimes happen that thelocation of the designated cell phone and an ATM location may notcoincide. Therefore, the member may select a notification option whichcauses the at least one computer of the service provider to operate tonotify the cell phone holder via a text message on the cell phone that“A transaction was just requested against your account at the ATMlocated at Wisconsin and M streets.” Many methods of informing theholder that they have a text message can be used. For example, anaudible (ring) or vibratory notification can be used. Additionally,messages other than in text format (e.g., a voice message, e-mailmessage, page or other messaging) can be used.

If the location and/or timing of the requested ATM transaction for whichnotice is given is suspicious to the member then he can furtherinvestigate. For example, he may call his spouse for verification. Ifnecessary, he can notify the ATM's bank and/or the police.Alternatively, the host (or the security service) may be programmed tonotify proper authorities of a potential fraud in progress at theparticular ATM. Thus, the scenario is cardholder/fraudprevention-centric.

In an exemplary embodiment of the security system, a selectable optionpermits the cell phone holder to grant permission for the requested ATMtransaction (e.g., by the spouse) to be remotely authorized. Permissioncan be granted by the security system to allow the ATM transaction toproceed upon receiving one or more messages corresponding to consentfrom the designated cell phone. Consent can be automatically grantedupon the system receiving a call from the designated cell phone to acertain phone number (or code) within a certain amount of time. Forexample, a person may initiate a consent call after verifying that theirspouse is trying to use the ATM. The consent call phone number (orconsent code or password) may also be selectable by a member in someembodiments of the fraud prevention system. The ATM may be instructed byits host to capture an inserted card responsive to the systemdetermining a mismatch of locations in combination with no receivedconsent call or other appropriate response to authorize the ATM usage.

It should be understood that in some embodiments there may be many otherdetection, notification, and consent options available. For example, anATM with a camera can capture an image of the current ATM user at thetime of the detected discrepancy in locations between the ATM and thecell phone. The captured user image (with or without a text message) canbe sent to the designated cell phone. The person having the cell phonein their possession can be notified (via the phone) of the discrepancyand that they have access to an image of the ATM user in question. Thecell phone holder can then view the user image on a display screen ofthe cell phone. The image can help the cell phone holder (e.g., owner)quickly determine whether to grant consent to the current ATM user. Thismay be done, for example, in the manner described in U.S. Pat. No.7,533,805 the disclosure of which is herein incorporated by reference inits entirety. Thus, consent can be image based. Communication and datatransfer between the security system and a designated cell phone canoccur in real time or near real time.

Also, in some embodiments more than one cell phone can be assigned to anaccount. This may be done, for example, by associating multiple cellphone numbers, text message numbers, e-mail addresses or otherpredetermined notification network addresses with an account in at leastone database that is accessible by one or more computers that areoperative to cause notifications to be given. Thus, the host can obtainthe current location of plural cell phones. For example, GPS ortriangulation of cell areas may be used to determine the cell phones'location. If the host (or another computer of the service provider)determines that one of the cell phones is currently located adjacent tothe ATM then the transaction request is permitted. This option enablesfamily members such as both spouses (who have respective cell phones) toseparately carry out an ATM transaction without requiring serviceprovider notification.

Other methods of communicating between the service provider and themember may be used in some embodiments. For example, a personal (humanvoice) phone call may be made on behalf of the service providernotifying the service member of the situation involving their account.This may be done through operation of an automated voice response (AVR)system in operative connection with one or more computers so as to dialand/or send a simulated voice message to one or more phones. This may bedone in the manner of the incorporated disclosure or through other typesof devices. Alternatively or in addition one or more computers of theservice provider may operate to give notice to a live service person tomake a call to the cell phone of the customer involved. The serviceprovider can call the cell phone number assigned to the member causingthe cell phone to ring. After the member answers their cell phone, theservice provider can inform the member of the discrepancy situation.Instead of a live person, a recorded message can be used for theinforming. Other communication formats can be used. This may include,for example, IM (instant messaging), text messaging and the like may bethe communications formats used to contact the member's cell phone.

Alternatively, a member's device other than their cell phone may becontacted by the service provider. For example, a notifying e-mail maybe sent (by the service provider such as through automated computerdispatch) to the member's home PC. A voice message may be left on themember's home answering machine. Alternatively or in addition the usermay be contacted via pager message, message to a service to which theuser subscribes, for example Twitter^(SM) or other methodology that isoperative to provide a user that reasonably prompt notification.

As discussed, in some embodiments different security levels of frauddetection and member notification can be selected by the member. Forexample, a different level of detection may use cell triangulation inplacing the location of a cell phone instead of having GPS embedded inthe cell phone. The cell in which the cell phone is deemed present canbe compared to the cell in which the ATM resides. If the cellscorrespond, then the transaction requester is authenticated as anauthorized user of the account. It should be understood that evenfurther detection and notification procedures may be available in someembodiments to members of the security system.

As previously discussed, an exemplary embodiment of the security systemenables authorization (or authentication) of ATM transactions based onthe (cellular) location of the security system member. The authorizationcan be further based on GPS location of the ATM. The exemplary securitysystem provides additional transaction security to help preventunauthorized ATM access to a financial account if it is determined thatthe location of the ATM from which the account transaction is beingrequested substantially differs from the location of the authorized userof the account. The location of the ATM can be determined via GPStechnology. The location of the authorized user can be determined viathe location of the user's cell phone. The location of the cell phonecan be determined via cellular or GPS/cellular technology.

It should be understood that the description of the security system withregard to ATMs is exemplary, but is not to be limited thereto. An ATM isone of many automated transaction machines in which the security systemcan be implemented. Likewise, the security system can be used withfacilities, such as gas stations. A positive comparison of the gasstation (or fuel pump) GPS location with the purchaser's cell phonelocation grants access to the fuel. Alternatively, a cellular device maybe located in or on a vehicle. When a person requests fuel for thevehicle, a comparison is made of the vehicle location (e.g., cellularlocation) and gas station location (e.g., GPS location). Additionally,the security system can be used in conjunction with other transactionfacilities, including stores, restaurants, etc. The security system canbe used where location-based verification or identification of a personis needed. The security system helps to reduce or prevent unauthorizeduse of a financial account by determining whether the location at whichthe account is trying to be used substantially differs from the currentlocation of the authorized user of the account.

The exemplary security arrangement permits a method to be carried outincluding the steps of (a) receiving input with an ATM, where the inputcorresponds to an account; (b) determining a current distance of anauthorized user of the account relative to the ATM; and (c) determiningwhether the received input corresponds to the authorized user responsiveto the determination in (b). Step (c) can include determining whether acurrent ATM customer is authorized access to the account responsive to acomputer comparison of the current location of the authorized userrelative to the ATM. The determination in (c) can include comparing ATMlocation to current authorized user location. The current authorizeduser location can correspond to location of a personal item of theauthorized user, where (b) includes determining location of a personalitem of the authorized user. The current authorized user location cancorrespond to location of a cell phone of the authorized user, where (b)includes determining location of a cell phone of the authorized user.The cell phone can include a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver,where (b) includes determining location of the cell phone via GPS. Theinput can correspond to an account of the authorized user, where (c)includes determining whether the current ATM customer is the authorizeduser. Step (a) can include receiving account data on/from a card. Step(a) can include receiving biometric input corresponding to an authorizeduser of the account.

The exemplary security arrangement permits another method to be carriedout including the steps of (a) receiving a transaction request at anautomated transaction machine, where the transaction request isassociated with an account; (b) determining location of the automatedtransaction machine; (c) determining at least one location of at leastone authorized user of the account; (d) comparing the locationdetermined in (b) to the at least one location determined in (c); and(e) responsive to a positive comparison in (d), granting the transactionrequest received in (a).

The exemplary security arrangement permits a further method to becarried out including the steps of (a) receiving customer identificationinput with an automated transaction machine; (b) determining a firstcustomer location as location of the machine, responsive to the input;(c) independent of (b), determining a second customer location ascurrent location of an item on the customer, responsive to the input;(d) comparing the first and second customer locations; and (e)responsive to a positive comparison in (d), authorizing a first customertransaction with the machine. Step (a) can include receiving customeridentification input with an ATM including a currency dispenser, andwhere (c) includes determining location of a cell phone.

The exemplary security arrangement permits another method to be carriedout including the steps of (a) determining location of a portablecommunication device affiliated with an authorized customer responsiveto input to an automated transaction machine; and (b) determiningwhether the input corresponds to the authorized customer responsive torelative location between the device and the machine. The portablecommunication device can comprise a cell phone. A customer of themachine can be authorized a transaction responsive to location of thecell phone corresponding to location of the machine. The machine cancomprise an ATM.

The exemplary security arrangement permits another method to be carriedout including the steps of (a) determining location of a cell phoneaffiliated with an authorized customer; and (b) authorizing to thecustomer a transaction with an automated transaction machine responsiveto location of the cell phone corresponding to location of the machine.

The exemplary security arrangement permits another method to be carriedout including the steps of (a) receiving input with an automatedtransaction machine, where the input is associated with a customeraffiliated with an object locatable independent of operation of themachine; and (b) authorizing a customer transaction with the machineresponsive to correspondence between location of the object and locationof the machine. The object can comprise a cellular item, a GPS item, oran RFID item, for example.

The exemplary security arrangement permits another method to beperformed including the steps of (a) receiving input with an automatedtransaction machine, wherein the input is associated with a customeraffiliated with a remotely locatable device; (b) operating at least onecomputer to determine location of the device; (c) operating the at leastone computer to determine whether the location of the device determinedin step (b) corresponds to location of the machine; and (d) responsiveto correspondence in step (c), authorizing to the customer a transactionwith the machine.

The exemplary security arrangement permits another method to beperformed including the steps of (a) receiving input with an automatedtransaction machine, wherein the input is affiliated with a cell phone;(b) operating at least one computer to determine whether location of thecell phone corresponds to location of the machine; and (c) responsive tocorrespondence in step (b), authorizing a transaction with the machine.

The exemplary security arrangement permits another method to beperformed including the steps of (a) receiving input with an automatedtransaction machine from a person associated with a cell phone; and (b)determining whether the person is an authorized user of the machineusing location of the cell phone relative to location of the machine.

The exemplary security arrangement can include an apparatus comprising:a system, where the system includes a plurality of cell phones, at leastone computer, a plurality of cash dispensing ATMs each having a GPSdevice, an ATM host in operative communication with and remote from theATMs, and a cell phone locator system in operative communication withand remote from the host; where the ATM is operative to receive useridentification data from a customer, the host can determine a cell phoneID assigned to the received user identification data, the host can alsodetermine location data corresponding to an ATM from either a databaseor from a GPS device in the ATM, the cell phone locator can determinethe current location of a cell phone corresponding to the cell phone IDresponsive to a request from the host, the cell phone locator can thensend the cell phone's location data to the host, the host can thencompare the cell phone's location data to the ATM's location data,responsive to the comparison the host can either authorize the customerto perform a transaction at the ATM if the locations correspond or denythe customer from performing a transaction at the ATM if the locationsdo not correspond.

The exemplary security arrangement can include another apparatuscomprising: at least one automated transaction machine, where eachmachine is operative to receive account information from a customerduring a transaction request, and a host, where the host includes atleast one computer, where the host is in operative communication withthe at least one machine, where the host is operative to determinegeographical location of a transaction request at a machine responsiveto account information received at the machine, where the host isoperative to determine geographical location of at least one authorizeduser corresponding to account information received at a machineindependent from a determination of geographical location of atransaction request at the machine, where the host is operative tocompare transaction request geographical location to authorized usergeographical location, and where the host is operative to determinewhether a machine customer corresponds to the at least one authorizeduser. The apparatus can further comprise a cell phone, where the host isoperative to determine geographical location of at least one authorizeduser via the cell phone. The cell phone can include a Global PositioningSystem (GPS) receiver. The apparatus can further comprise a cell phonelocator system, where the cell phone locator system is operative todetermine the current location of the cell phone. The host can be inoperative communication with the cell phone locator system, where thehost is in operative to request the cell phone location from the cellphone locator system. The cell phone locator system is operative toprovide the current location of the cell phone to the host. At least oneautomated transaction machine comprises at least one automated tellermachine (“ATM”), where each ATM includes a currency dispenser, and whereeach currency dispenser is operative to dispense currency from arespective ATM. Each ATM is operative to receive account informationfrom a customer during a transaction request. At least one ATM includesa GPS receiver. The host is operative to determine geographical locationof at least one ATM via GPS data. The host is operative to compare cellphone location to ATM location to determine whether a current ATMcustomer corresponds to an authorized ATM user.

In alternative arrangements, a RFID object can be used instead of or incombination with cellular and GPS objects. An RFID object can be used toverify that the current ATM user is an authorized user. The RFID objectcan be separate from a user card. The RFID object can be used as anothersecurity level for verifying user authorization. The ATM has a RFIDreader. The user data read from the RFID object (tag) is compared toanother form of user identification (user card, user fingerprint, irisscan, other biometrics, etc.). The comparing can take place at the ATM,ATM host, or security center. The comparison can be used to determine ifthe RFID object ID and user ID correspond. A positive correspondencepermits the user to use the ATM for transactions. If the ATM is unableto obtain the necessary data from the RFID object (which is anindication that the RFID object is not adjacent the ATM) then usage ofthe ATM is denied.

The ability to locate an ATM's geographical position can also be used toprovide location-oriented services to the public. A service provider(“SP”) can provide the services. The service provider can comprise or beassociated with a previously discussed security center or service centerincluding one or more computers. A computer in the ATM (or the GPSsystem) can convey coordinate location data to the service provider. Theservice provider computer or computers can operate to store this ATMlocation data in a database along with other location data correspondingto other ATMs. Thus, the database can include the locations of pluralATMs, including ATMs belonging to different banking networks. Thedatabase may also contain location information for many other locationsthat may be of public or private interest. The database may contain datacorresponding to waypoint location information, e.g., stores, foodestablishments, bank branches, or even dynamic ATM-service vehiclelocations.

ATMs with GPS capability provide the capability to reference coordinatesfor ATM-based map generation. The database can also store map data. Aservice provider can use a geographical starting point reference fromwhich to generate a variety of “how to get there from here” directions,which may be in the form of a map.

An ATM direction-providing service can receive a request for directionsfrom one or more entities (e.g., a person, computer, machine, etc.). Forexample, a person at a first location (e.g., a merchant store, fuelstation, restaurant, etc.) may wish to have directions to the nearestATM. The direction requester may be a person desiring to use an ATM toperform a financial transaction (e.g., cash withdrawal, reload a smartcard, etc.). Of course the individual may also be an ATM service personneeding to located a malfunctioning ATM.

The system allows a person to provide their current (or best known)location to the service provider. The current location may be providedto the service provider in numerous known ways. From this “currentlocation” information, the location service can instruct or providedirections to the person on how to get to the nearest (or desired) ATM.The service provider can also provide directions to the nearest ATMbelonging to a requested particular bank or financial institution (e.g.,a bank belonging to the requester's home banking network).

The service provider providing the directions can be a company, person,computer, and/or machine. The service provider can communicate with adirection requester via diverse communication devices and processes. Thedirection-providing service can be made available to a directionrequester via a variety of communication devices, such as PDA, cellphone, Internet, address input, input device equipped with a GPSreceiver, on-line devices, and off-line devices. Other knowntransmission processes suitable for communication may be used, includinganalog, digital, wireless, radio wave, microwave, satellite, andInternet communication. For example, the service provider may operateone or more computers to communicate with a person using voicerecognition software and speech software. In another example, a personcan wirelessly transmit their request along with their current GPSlocation to the direction-providing service over the Internet via ahand-held computer or cell phone. In response, the service can download(e.g., as e-mail, PDF file, voice mail, instant message, etc.) therequested directions (e.g., a detailed map) to the hand-held computer.In a further example, a cell phone can include a GPS system. The personcan wirelessly transmit their request along with their current GPSlocation to the service via the cell phone. For example, when the cellphone calls a particular phone number of the service provider for adirections request, the cell phone also transmits its current GPSlocation. Alternatively, the service provider computer can operate torecognize the cell phone number via caller ID, match the cell phone'snumber to the cell phone's GPS system, obtain the cell phone's currentlocation from the cell phone's GPS system, and then transmit directionsto the nearest ATM based on the cell phone's location.

FIG. 20 shows one or more computers of a service provider 380 inoperative connection with a database 390. The service provider 380includes at least one computer 382. The service provider 380 cansimultaneously communicate with and provide information to pluralrequesters 384, 386, 388.

The database 390 can store ATM location data 392, map data 394, andadditional data 396. Such additional data 396 may be key words orphrases, such as landmark names, points of interest, streetintersections, city sections such as Chinatown and Little Italy, etc.For example, a requester may not know their exact address location butcan inform the service provider (via their phone) that they are near theintersection of 19th and M streets. The computer 382 can operate torecognize (such as via voice recognition software) the receivedintersection as location information. From the intersection informationthe computer 382 can provide the requested directions. It should beunderstood that directions can also contain landmarks, points ofinterest, street intersections, etc. For example, by knowing whichintersection the requester is near and the (real time) visual lay out ofthe city, the service provider 380 can instruct the requester that thenearest ATM is next to a landmark that is easily visible from theintersection. Such a landmark may be a well lit (neon) sign, a belltower, a pedestrian bridge, etc. Thus, additional stored data 396 can beused by the service provider computer 382 to more accurately understandrequests and provide locations/directions to requesters.

An exemplary flowchart of requesting/receiving service is shown in FIG.21. The actions performed by the requester and by the service providerare also shown. In the exemplary method a requester (e.g., a person)contacts the service provider.

The SP acknowledges the contact and asks for the person's PIN or serviceaccess code. The person provides their PIN.

The SP compares the PIN with a list of valid PINs and determines the PINacceptable. The level of service associated with the PIN is obtained.The SP asks for the person's current location. The person notifies theSP of their current location (e.g., an address, notable landmark, etc.).

The SP analyzes (e.g., voice recognition, speech to data interpretation,etc.) the provided location for best fit location comprehension. Thatis, the SP computer tries to recognize the provided location. Thecomprehended location may be compared to locations in the database todetermine if it is a usable (valid) location. If the provided locationis not usable, then the SP may ask the person to again provide thelocation, or more information may be requested to ensure locationaccuracy. For example, the SP may speak the comprehended location to theperson and ask the person to validate whether the location is correct.Once a provided location is deemed valid, then the SP can ask for theperson's request. In response, the person may request directions to thenearest available ATM.

The SP uses the database information to determine the shortest availableroute from the person's current location to the nearest ATM. The SPgenerates directions in a format capable of being received by theperson. The format can match the format in which the request wasreceived. For example, if the request was made via the person's cellphone, then the directions can be provided in a form capable of beingreceived by the person's cell phone. The SP provides the directions tothe person. The person receives the directions. It should be understoodthat in other arrangements greater or fewer steps may be carried out,and the order of the steps can vary.

The person's request for directions may be selected from a list ofoptions. For example, options may include press number 1 for informationregarding the nearest ATM, press number 2 for information regarding thenearest fee-free ATM, etc. Once the first option is input then anotherset of options may be provided to the person. The second set of optionsmay relate to the context in which the information content is to beprovided. For example, assuming that the nearest ATM was selected in thefirst option set, the second options may include press number 1 for theATM address, press number 2 for a map to the ATM, press number 3 for anoperator to guide you to the ATM, etc. Further sets of options mayfollow to ensure the desired service. The service provider can know thelevel of service available to the requester based on the provided PIN.Likewise, other information (e.g., requester's home banking network) cancorrespond to the provided PIN.

The person's communication device may partake in obtaining the person'scurrent location and in notifying the service of the current location.For example, the person's communication device may include GPS. GPS,triangulation of cell areas, or other manners may be used to determinethe requester's (cell phone) location. Also, a person's request fordirections may be a default request based on the manner ofcommunication. For example, a service provider may treat any personcalling their phone number as a direction requester by default. Thus, aperson may not have to actually (e.g., verbally) request directions, italready being inferred.

The direction-providing service may be a free service, a pay-as-you-useservice, and/or limited to paid subscribers. A person may have access tothe service as a result of being a valued customer of a particular bank.For example, an ATM customer that regularly incurs ATM transaction feesto the bank may receive free access to the ATM-directing service. Thebank can provide (or pay for) the service on behalf of the valuedcustomer.

The level of service may vary with the type of service to which theperson has subscribed. For example, one type of service may includehaving a personal assistant stay on a phone with the person until theycorrectly and safely reach their desired ATM, while another level ofservice may simply provide the street address of the nearest ATM.

FIG. 23 shows schematically the system of an exemplary embodiment thatmay be operated to minimize the risk of a user's financial account beingaccessed by an unauthorized person at an automated banking machine. Itshould be understood that the system is shown schematically and ishighly simplified for purposes of facilitating explanation.

The system shown in FIG. 23 includes automated banking machines 402, 404and 406. The automated banking machines may in some embodiments be ATMsand in other embodiments other types of banking machines may be used.The automated banking machines are connected through one or morenetworks 408 with one or more remotely located computers. In theexemplary embodiment, the remote computers include a host computer 410.The host computer can include one or multiple computers that are inoperative communication with one or more data stores schematicallyindicated 412. The exemplary embodiment further includes one or moreother remote computers. This is schematically represented by a server416. Server 416 is also in operative connection with one or more datastores 418.

In the exemplary embodiment, the host computer 410 is in operativeconnection with a wireless communication system schematically indicated420. Similarly, in this exemplary embodiment the server 416 is also inoperative connection with a wireless communication system schematicallyindicated 422. In exemplary embodiments, the wireless communicationsystem may be operative to provide connections to achieve communicationswith cell phones, such as phone 424 schematically shown in FIG. 23. Thewireless communication systems may be in operative connection with oneor more wireless networks. Alternatively or in addition, the wirelesscommunication networks may be operative to communicate wirelessly withother devices. This may include in some embodiments, the capability forcommunication of GPS data for tracking cell phones or other wirelessdevices, as previously discussed. Alternatively or in addition, thewireless communication capability may be usable for wireless tracking ofthe automated banking machines or other items.

In the exemplary embodiment, the automated banking machines may includeinput devices of the types previously discussed. This may include, forexample, a card reader which is operative to read data from user cardswhich correspond to financial accounts. The automated banking machinesmay also include other input devices which have a capability to provideuser identifying data. The exemplary automated banking machines may alsoinclude input devices such as keypads which are usable to receive manualinputs from users. This may include, for example, data such as personalidentification numbers (PINs). Keypads may also be used for receivingtransaction amounts or other user-provided inputs. It should beunderstood for purposes of this disclosure that keypads can includetouch screens or other devices that can receive user selectable inputs.

Exemplary automated banking machines may also include other inputdevices such as for example a bar code reader. Bar code readers may beusable to read for example one-dimensional or multi-dimensional barcodes for purposes of determining the data represented thereby. Ofcourse this is accomplished thorough operation of one or more bankingmachine computers that are included in each of the automated bankingmachines. Further, in some exemplary embodiments image capture devices,such as cameras, may be associated with or mounted near or within eachof the automated banking machines. The image capture devices may operatein connection with one or more computers and systems having thecapabilities described in U.S. Pat. No. 7,533,805, the entire disclosureof which is herein incorporated by reference. Of course thesecapabilities are exemplary and in other embodiments other approaches maybe used.

In the exemplary embodiment, the one or more servers 416 can havecapabilities like those described in U.S. Pat. No. 7,516,087, thedisclosure of which has been herein incorporated in its entirety. Thisincludes for example, including in the one or more data stores 418 datawhich corresponds to user data and messages or other actions to bepresented and/or taken when a particular user is determined to berequesting a transaction at a particular ATM. This can include forexample, presenting certain specific determined messages to theparticular user based on stored information and/or criteria associatedwith that particular user.

In this particular exemplary embodiment, the one or more server datastores 418 include data corresponding to one or more predeterminednotification network addresses. The network addresses are associatedwith user data that is received by the server 416 responsive to a userconducting a transaction at a particular automated banking machine. Thisnetwork address data may correspond to one or more ways of communicatingwith the particular user. In exemplary embodiments, these ways ofcommunicating may correspond to communication with a user's cell phone.This data may include, for example, address data for calling theparticular user's cell phone. Alternatively or in addition, the addressdata may include data for communicating a text message to the user'sparticular cell phone. Alternatively or in addition, the data mayinclude an e-mail address at which messages are receivable with theuser's cell phone or other manner for communicating with the particularuser's cell phone or other mobile device so as to enable thecommunication to be provided to the user during or proximate to theconduct of a particular transaction at an automated banking machine.Furthermore, the exemplary embodiment of the one or more servers 416includes computer executable instructions that are operative to causethe server to generate message content appropriate for messages to becommunicated to a user's cell phone or other mobile device related toparticular transaction conditions. Alternatively or in addition, suchmessage generation capabilities may be associated with other connectedcomputers and/or the wireless communication system with which the server416 is connected.

In the exemplary embodiment, the host system may operate in a mannerlike that discussed in the incorporated disclosures to receive messagesfrom an automated banking machine and to cause a financial transferrelated to an account corresponding to card data on a card that is readfor purposes of carrying out the transaction at the particular machine.Thus for example, in exemplary embodiments the host 410 may receive oneor more messages from an automated banking machine at which a user isrequesting a transaction. These host messages may include datacorresponding to card data which identifies the user and/or theirfinancial account. The host messages may include data corresponding to aPIN number or other identifier presented by the user at the bankingmachine. The one or more messages sent to the host from the bankingmachine may generally also include information regarding the type oftransaction the user wishes to conduct. This may include, for example, acash withdrawal from the automated banking machine. The one or moremessages sent to the host may also include data corresponding to anamount associated with the transaction that the user wishes to conduct.This may include for example, in a cash withdrawal transaction, arequest for $200 to be dispensed from the banking machine and assessedto a user's checking account.

In exemplary embodiments the host may operate in accordance with itsprogramming based on data stored in the one or more data stores, todetermine that the card data corresponds to an authorized user whoseaccount is authorized to carry out the requested transaction. The hostcomputer may also operate in accordance with its programming todetermine that PIN number data or other data included with a messagecorresponds to that which is appropriate for the particular user oraccount. This is done based on the host computer operating to determinethat the data included in the message corresponds to data in the one ormore data stores 412. Of course these approaches are exemplary and otherapproaches can be used.

The host computer may also determine that the requested automatedbanking machine transaction is authorized for the particular accountand/or user, and operates to cause one or more messages to be sent fromthe host to the particular automated banking machine. This may include,for example, including data in the messages which indicates that thetransaction is authorized. In response to receiving the messages fromthe host, the automated banking machine operates to carry out theauthorized transaction. In this example, this would include operating acash dispenser to cause cash stored in the machine in the requestedamount of $200 to be dispensed to a user.

Of course in a situation where the host computer determines that thetransaction is not authorized, then the messages sent to the automatedbanking machine will indicate that the transaction is not to beconducted. In this case, the automated banking machine may operate todisplay an appropriate message to the user, and will also operate tocancel the transaction. In some embodiments, and based on the messagesfrom the host to the automated banking machine, the user card may bereturned to the user. In cases where the card is reported stolen orotherwise the programming of the host indicates the card is beingimproperly used, the messages to the automated banking machine mayoperate to cause the banking machine to capture the card. Of coursethese approaches are exemplary.

Furthermore, in exemplary embodiments the automated banking machine mayoperate once it has successfully carried out the authorized transaction,to generate one or more messages to the host to indicate the successfulcompletion of the transaction. This may be done through operation of theone or more banking machine computers included in the machine, whichoperate in accordance with their programming to cause such messages tobe sent to the host. The host may operate in accordance with itsprogramming in response to the data included in such sent messages tocause a financial transfer from the user's account in an amountcorresponding to the cash dispensed. Alternatively, if the automatedbanking machine was not able to carry out the transaction (for examplethe cash could not be dispensed), the at least one computer in theautomated banking machine operates to cause one or more messages to besent to the host with data indicating that the authorized transactioncould not be carried out. The host operates in response to such messagesfrom the automated banking machine to record that the transaction couldnot be completed. The host also operates in such circumstances inaccordance with its programming not to charge the user's account for thevalue of the requested transaction. The host may further operate inaccordance with its programming to cause a notification to be given inappropriate circumstances of a problem or other situation at the bankingmachine that will need to be remedied because the transaction could notbe completed. This might include for example, information that thetransaction was unable to be completed because the automated bankingmachine does not contain sufficient cash. The host may operate inaccordance with its programming to give notice to appropriate servicepersons to replenish the machine with cash. Of course these operationsand steps are exemplary, and in other embodiments other approaches maybe used.

In the system schematically represented in FIG. 23 the system mayoperate to provide additional assurance or security that a requestedtransaction at an automated banking machine has been authorized by theactual owner of the account. This is accomplished in an exemplaryembodiment by the user being contacted via a cell phone (or othermobile/portable device) message during the transaction through aparticular network address associated with the cell phone that they haveregistered for receiving notifications. In a manner previouslydiscussed, the cell phone's contact data can be associated (linked) in adata store with user identification data (e.g., account data). The useridentification data (or data corresponding thereto) can be read by theautomated banking machine. Thus, user data read by the automated bankingmachine can be used to access stored contact data for the correct cellphone.

In one exemplary embodiment, the cell phone operates to receive aparticular message or security data that the user is required to inputto the automated banking machine in order to have a transaction proceed.The security data can comprise a code. The received message can includethe security data, which may also be referred to herein as permission,authorization, confirming, consent, approval, identifier, or securitydata. User input of the transaction security data (e.g., code) at themachine is sensed through operation of the at least one banking machinecomputer. The code is compared and verified (determined) as theappropriate (e.g., same) code that was sent during the transaction tothe cell phone that is associated in a data store with the particularuser.

Of course if the user's card has been stolen, the message that is sentto the user's cell phone will alert the actual authorized user that a(fraudulent) transaction is being attempted. Of course the person (e.g.,a thief) attempting unauthorized use of the automated banking machinewill not receive the provided code. Thus, a fraudulent transactionrequest will not be authorized to be carried out even in circumstanceswhere a thief (i.e., as an operator of the machine) has an authorizedcard/ID and PIN number for a particular account.

The exemplary software logic flow carried out through operation ofbanking machine computers in the automated banking machine in a systemwhich has these capabilities is schematically represented in FIGS. 24and 25. As can be appreciated, before a user approaches the automatedbanking machine it may be operating in a wait mode. This may include,for example, outputting particular promotional messages or otherinformation to attract a user to the machine and/or providinginstructions to a user on how to commence a transaction with themachine. In the exemplary embodiment, the machine user may commence atransaction by inserting or swiping a card which includes datacorresponding to the user's financial account. This is representedschematically in FIG. 24 by a step 426 in which the machine operates tocause a user's card to be read. This can be done for example throughoperation of a card reader in the machine.

In accordance with the incorporated disclosure, the exemplary embodimentof the banking machine computer is operative to cause to be sent to theserver 416 one or more messages including data corresponding to at leasta portion of the read card data. This is represented in a step 428. Ofcourse as can be appreciated, the one or more messages to the server 416may be encrypted or otherwise configured so as to reduce the risk ofunauthorized interception of the data that is exchanged in the messagesbetween the automated banking machine and the at least one server 416.

In operation of the automated banking machine in this exemplaryembodiment, the machine then operates in accordance with the softwareinstructions to receive PIN data from a user. This is represented by astep 430. The user inputs their PIN number through a keypad or otherinput device on the machine. Of course it should be understood thatother input devices for receiving identifying information may be used.This may include for example biometric inputs, facial recognitioninputs, or other inputs that are suitable for identifying the particularuser or their account.

In the exemplary embodiment, the automated banking machine operates inaccordance with its programming to provide a user with transactionoptions that the user may select. These transaction options correspondto transaction types that the user could conduct at a machine. Theembodiment operates to receive from the user one or more inputs whichare indicative of the particular transaction type that the user wishesto conduct at the machine. This is represented by step 432. For purposesof this example, it will be presumed that the user wishes to request acash withdrawal from their account, such as their checking account.

Step 434 represented in FIG. 24 corresponds to receipt by the automatedbanking machine from the user of the particular amount associated withthe transaction that they wish to conduct. In this case the amount ofthe cash withdrawal would be $200. The automated banking machineoperates to receive through inputs from the user, an indication thatthis is the amount of the particular cash withdrawal that the userwishes to receive. This can be done through a keypad, touch screen, orother suitable input devices.

In the exemplary embodiment of the system represented in FIG. 23, theautomated banking machine operates responsive to one or more servermessages from the server 416 to provide a particular output for usersthat have elected to receive a service in which additional authorizationis required in order to conduct transactions. This includes in thisexemplary embodiment, responsive to operation of the server 416, receiptof a message through their designated mobile phone or other portabledevice, which indicates the occurrence of a transaction at an automatedbanking machine. Further in this exemplary embodiment, the serveroperates in the manner later described in detail to cause to be sent tothe mobile phone, a particular code (or other transaction relatedidentifier) which the user must input/provide to the banking machine toallow the machine to carry out the requested transaction.

In some systems, a requirement for additional transaction authorizationmay be triggered by the type of transaction being requested. Forexample, if a cash withdrawal transaction is requested and the user carddata corresponds in a data store to a cell phone contact, then asecurity code may be sent to the cell phone. Thus, based on thetransaction type, the banking machine can be programmed to additionallyexpect or request the machine user (during the transaction) to inputdata corresponding to a security code. However, even though an accountmay be associated with a cell phone, other types of account transactions(e.g., an account balance request transaction) may not necessarilytrigger the additional security steps that include the sending of asecurity code to a customer's cell phone followed by user input of thecode to the machine. In such a scenario, the banking machine may beprogrammed to not expect any user input of data corresponding to asecurity code.

In an exemplary embodiment, at least one computer of the machine isprogrammed to carry out a transaction, such as a cashwithdrawal/dispensing transaction. The programming may cause thecomputer to carry out the transaction in stages. For example, in a firststage of the transaction the machine computer causes a reader device(e.g., card reader) to obtain user identifying data from a user of themachine. In a second stage of the transaction the computer sends amessage to a remote computer (e.g., server). The message causes cellphone contact data to be obtained (by the remote computer) from a datastore which associates the cell phone contact data with the useridentifying data. The message also causes a security code to be sent (bythe remote computer) to the user cell phone which corresponds to thecell phone contact data. In a third stage of the transaction thecomputer receives user inputted data through an input device of themachine. In a fourth stage of the transaction the machine computercauses cash to be dispensed, based on the received user inputcorresponding to the sent security code. Of course it should beunderstood that other transaction stages/steps can occur between thesementions stages. For example, before the fourth stage the machinecomputer can cause the inputted data to be sent to the remote computerfor comparison with the security code, and receive the comparisonresult.

In some exemplary embodiments, the code may be a random one-time usecode that is generated through operation of the server (or othercomputer in operative connection with the server) executing a randomcharacter generation program. The random characters may include in someembodiments, numbers, letters, or other characters which are included ina code that otherwise cannot be predicted in advance, and which the useris required to input to allow the transaction to proceed. Thus, in theexemplary embodiment, in step 436 the machine receives from the user inresponse to an (message) output through a banking machine displaydevice, the (same) code that the server caused to be sent to the user'smobile device. Of course it should be understood that if the transactionis not being conducted by the authorized user, then the personconducting the transaction will not know the required code. Thus, theperson will not be able to input the correct code, and therefor willinput an improper code or no code.

Furthermore, code entry can be time sensitive. Thus, if the personoperating the automated banking machine does not input the correct codewithin a given time period, the machine may operate to cancel thetransaction and return to its initial waiting state. The machine mayalso operate in accordance with its programming to return the user cardto the user.

In the exemplary embodiment, after receiving the code from the user, theautomated banking machine computer operates in accordance with itsprogramming to send one or more messages to the server 416. These one ormore messages include data corresponding to at least a portion of thecode that was received from the user. This is represented in step 438.Of course as can be appreciated as in the case with the other servermessages and host messages, such messages may be appropriately encryptedor otherwise configured to reduce the risk of interception.

In the exemplary embodiment, the server operates in the manner hereafterexplained to determine if the user-inputted data (corresponding to thecode) that was sent by the automated banking machine to the server instep 438, corresponds to the (same) code that the server generated andcaused to be sent to the user's mobile device. The server operates inresponse to this determination to send to the automated banking machine,one or more messages with data which indicates whether the user-inputteddata corresponds to the data (code) that was included in the one or moremessages sent to the cell phone. Machine receipt of these messages isrepresented by a step 440 in FIG. 25.

In a step represented 442, the automated banking machine computeroperates in accordance with its programming to determine from the one ormore messages received in step 440 whether the data included thereinindicates that the transaction should proceed. If the server determinedthat the transaction should not proceed, the banking machine computeroperates in accordance with its programming to return the user's card.This is represented in a step 444. The machine also operates to cancelthe transaction as represented in step 446. However, as can beappreciated, a record of the transaction may be recorded and stored inthe machine, at the server or in other connected computers so as toprovide data usable to determine whether there is a pattern of possiblefraudulent activity related to a particular card. After canceling thetransaction, the machine then returns to its waiting state to beginanother transaction.

In the exemplary embodiment, if the one or more messages received by themachine from the server indicates that the transaction should proceed,then the automated banking machine operates in accordance with itsprogramming to send one or more messages to the host 410. These one ormore messages may be of the type previously discussed which include datacorresponding to the card data, identifying information such as the PIN,transaction type, and amount. The sending of such one or more messagesto the host is represented by step 448. Therefore, after performing theadditional security process, the machine can communicate with the hostto carry out the transaction process. As later described, part of thetransaction process may occur while the additional security process isbeing carried out.

The host operates in response to the receipt of the messages from theautomated banking machine to determine if the card data corresponds toan authorized financial account and whether the account is authorized toperform the transaction in the amount requested. The host also operatesto cause to be determined whether the PIN number or other identifyingdata corresponds to a particular authorized user that is permitted toconduct a transaction on the account. Based on this determination, thehost operates to send one or more messages to the ATM which includesdata corresponding to whether the transaction should be allowed toproceed. These host messages are received by the automated bankingmachine as represented in a step 450.

The banking machine computer then operates in accordance with itsprogramming to determine if the messages received from the host indicatethat the transaction is authorized by the host. This is represented in astep 452. If the data included in the one or more messages from the hostindicate the transaction is not authorized, the banking machine willoperate in accordance with its programming to return the user's card.This is represented in step 454. The machine will also cancel thetransaction as represented in step 456. In the exemplary embodiment, themachine will then return to the waiting state for another transaction.Of course it should be understood that in some embodiments the one ormore messages returned by the host may indicate that the user's card isto be captured, additional images are to be taken of the user, or otheractivities are to be conducted through operation of the one or morebanking machine computers. The steps taken depend on the particularprogramming of the system and the content of the particular messagesreceived from the host computer. It should be understood that the stepsdescribed are exemplary and in other embodiments other steps orapproaches may be used.

If the one or more messages received by the automated banking machinefrom the host indicate that the transaction is authorized to be carriedout, the automated banking machine operates in accordance with itsprogramming to cause the particular devices of the machine to operate soas to complete the transaction. This is represented by a step 458. Thisincludes for example, dispensing cash through operation of the cashdispenser to the user in the amount of the $200 requested. This may alsoinclude the operation of other devices such as a printer to provide theuser with a receipt, operating the display to provide the user withinstructions to take their cash, or other steps/operations. Further, itshould be understood that the automated banking machine computer mayoperate in accordance with its programming to provide the user withpromotional or other messages such as those described in theincorporated disclosure as the transaction requested is being fulfilledthrough operation of the devices of the banking machine.

The automated banking machine of the exemplary embodiment operates inaccordance with its programming to send one or more messages to thehost. These messages indicate whether the transaction that wasauthorized was enabled to be successfully carried out. This isrepresented by a step 460. If the transaction was enabled to besuccessfully carried out, the host computer operates responsive to thedata included in the one or more host messages to cause the user'saccount to be assessed for the value of the cash dispensed. Of course ifthe transaction could not be carried out, the host may operate in themanner previously discussed to avoid assessing the user's account forany amount. The host may also operate in accordance with its programmingto cause notifications to be given or to take other steps to remedy anyservice problem that may be determined to exist at the machine which maybe preventing the machine from fully carrying out transactions.

In the exemplary embodiment, after sending the messages to the hostregarding the fulfillment of the transaction or taking the other steps,the machine can return to its waiting state pending the initiation ofanother transaction by a user. This is represented in FIG. 25 by a step462. Of course it should be understood that this schematic logic flowwhich is represented in FIGS. 24 and 25 is highly simplified and doesnot show certain actions and steps that may be carried out throughoperation of the one or more banking machine computers.

Furthermore, it should be understood that the steps carried out by thebanking machine computer are carried out by computer executinginstructions that are recorded on one or more articles in the machinewhich hold such instructions. Such articles may include for example ahard drive which includes the data and software used in operation of themachine. The hard drive may be in operative connection with the one ormore banking machine computers. Alternatively or in addition, otherarticles which include computer executable instructions may includeflash memory devices, DVDs, CDs, read-only memories, programmableread-only memories or any other form of electrical, magnetic or opticalstorage media from which computer executable instructions and data maybe recovered for execution. Thus, programming software can cause bankingmachine computers to perform transaction operations. Similarly, othercomputers operated in the system may have computer executableinstructions stored on similar articles for purposes of carrying outtheir program steps. This includes for example, articles of computerreadable media associated with the servers and the host computers usedin the system.

The logic executed by the server 416 in the course of the transactionjust described is represented in FIG. 26. As shown therein, the server416 receives the one or more messages from the automated banking machinewhich includes data corresponding to at least a portion of the card dataand/or other user data which is sufficient for the server to identifydata that is associated with the card and/or a user. This is representedschematically by the step 464.

In an exemplary embodiment, users are enabled to sign up for the serviceeither by mail, through an online interface, by phone, or other suitablemethodology that eventually results in data being stored in one or moredata stores 418 associated with one or more servers. This data is usableto indicate whether a user card/account or other user data is associatedwith someone who has signed up for the additionalauthentication/security requirements.

It should further be understood that in some embodiments the card datawhich was sent to the system which identifies the user, may include notonly account data which identifies the particular account, but may alsoinclude the user name on the user's particular card. It may also includeother features such as biometric data, data corresponding to facialrecognition data, or other data which may identify a particular userbeyond the particular account data. This may include name data encodedon the magnetic card stripe. This is useful where spouses share a common(same) account but have different user cards (and phones), each of whichincludes the user's name. Thus for example, some embodiments may operateto send the user name data to the server so as to distinguish thepredetermined notification network address associated with a cell phonefor each particular spouse. This enables for example, the particularbanking machine user (first spouse) to be notified of the transactionthrough their cell phone (or other portable device) based on the datareceived at the banking machine, even though their account data isidentical to that of another user (second spouse). Of course it shouldbe understood that this approach is exemplary and in other embodimentsother approaches may be used.

In the exemplary operation of the server, the server operates inresponse to the data received in the messages from the automated bankingmachine to determine if the data received corresponds to a user who hassigned up for the service. This is represented in a step 466. This isdone by the server recovering and analyzing the data regardingregistered users included in the one or more data stores 418. If thedata received from the automated banking machine does not correspond toan individual who has signed up for this service, the server may operatein accordance with its programming to return one or more messages to theautomated banking machine. These messages may include for example, amessage to delete the requirement for the input of a code as associatedwith a step 436. This will allow the automated banking machine toproceed to verify the transaction based solely on the data associatedwith the card and PIN data sent to the host. Alternatively or inaddition, the server may operate in accordance with its programming tocause one or more messages to be sent to the banking machine which causethe machine to present to a particular user, information about the factthat the secondary/additional authentication provided through a mobiledevice is available and to consider signing up for this service. Furtheras previously discussed, users in some embodiments may be prompted as towhether they wish to sign up for this service through the bankingmachine in the manner of special user messages and responses like thoseof the incorporated disclosure. This may be done after the user has beenauthorized by the host as an individual who is authorized to conducttransactions at the banking machine by having their card, PIN and/orother data verified. Of course these approaches are exemplary. Thesending by the server of the one or more messages to the automatedbanking machine so as to indicate that a mobile provided code will notbe required to conduct the transaction is represented in FIG. 26 by step468.

If in step 466 the data received form the automated banking machineindicates that the particular card data associated with the transactionis registered to require the additional authentication required by thesystem, the server 416 operates to generate a code. This is representedin a step 470. As previously discussed, in some exemplary embodimentsthis code may correspond to a random code or a code that has at leastone random portion. For example, in some embodiments the random code maybe generated through operation of random number generation softwareoperating in the server. This random code may be a code that is notpredictable in advance of the time of the particular transaction. Ofcourse these approaches are exemplary and in other embodiments otherapproaches may be used.

The server then operates as represented by a step 472 to cause therandom code to be sent to the particular cell phone which corresponds inthe one or more data stores with the user data received. This is done inthe exemplary embodiment by the server operating to determine from theuser data it receives from the banking machine, the predeterminednotification network address (e.g., phone number) which corresponds tothe particular cell phone associated with the user of the card that hasbeen presented at the automated banking machine. The data store may alsooperate to include the particular type of notification to be given tothe address. This may include for example a text message, e-mailmessage, voice notification message, or other suitable messagesufficient to notify the user of the code that is required to be inputto the banking machine in order to allow the transaction to proceed. Oneor more data stores associated with the server may include datacorresponding to the particular method of notification to be given to aparticular user. It may also include instructions which are operative tocause notification to be given through different alternativemethodologies. For example, the user may be given a minute toacknowledge a text message which is sent to their specified cell phone.If acknowledgment of the message is not received within the programmedtime period, a phone call to the cell phone and communicating the datathrough an AVR system may be utilized. Further, in some embodiments ifthe user fails to acknowledge receipt of the code to the system within aparticular time period, the server may operate to prevent thetransaction from being accomplished. Of course some embodiments may notrequire an acknowledgment of receipt of the code beyond input to thebanking machine. It should be understood that these described approachesare exemplary and other approaches and steps may be used.

As represented in the step 472 the at least one server 416 operates tocause the code that is generated through operation of the server and anappropriate message to be sent to the user's cell phone through thewireless communication system 422. Of course as can be appreciated, thevarious steps and additional notifications may be given in somealternative embodiments in accordance with the programming of theparticular system. The message that is dispatched from the server isreceived by the phone 424 that has the network address data that isassociated in the at least one data store with the particular user datafor the card that is being used in the transaction.

The user in response to receiving the particular code on their phone,will then provide the code through one or more input devices to theautomated banking machine in a step 436. In exemplary embodiments themessage to the user's phone may include a statement that a transactionis currently conducted at an ATM and they are required to input theparticular code in order to allow the transaction to proceed. Such amessage will also operate to alert a user who may not be at an automatedbanking machine that a fraud is being attempted. The message to theuser's phone may also indicate to the user a need to provide aparticular responsive message if, in fact, they are not conducting sucha transaction and they believe that such a transaction to be fraudulent.This may include for example the user providing one or more text messageinputs, inputting a specified character (e.g., #2), calling, orotherwise contacting one or more network addresses to provide an inputor message that will cause the server and/or the host to block thetransaction.

Alternatively or in addition, in some embodiments the message sent tothe user's cell phone may give the user the option to allow thetransaction to proceed even though the code is not presented. This maybe done for example in circumstances where the user has given their cardto a child or other person for use on a temporary basis and the user isnot with the child or other person at the time. This may be done in someembodiments by the user being instructed to provide an input through thephone of one or more types of confidential information that would onlybe known to the particular user. This might include for example a secretcode other than the PIN, the user's mother's maiden name, or othersecret data that has been established and recorded in a data storepreviously. Providing such an option may enable a transaction to proceedin emergency circumstances. It will also prevent a transaction fromproceeding in circumstances where the user does not wish for thetransaction to proceed. Of course these approaches are exemplary.

Further, while the exemplary embodiment discusses the presentation of acode that a user is allowed to manually input to the banking machinesuch as through a keypad, other embodiments may cause the code to beinput in other ways to the machine. This may include for example, havingthe mobile device output a two or three-dimensional bar code on thephone display. The bar code may include the data to authorize thetransaction. The bar code may be input in some exemplary embodiments bythe bar code reader of the particular automated banking machine readingthe bar code from the display of the cell phone. Alternatively or inaddition, the automated banking machine may include features like thosediscussed in U.S. Pat. No. 7,516,087 the disclosure of which has beenherein incorporated by reference in its entirety. In such cases theautomated banking machine may be associated with an image capture devicesuch as a camera. The phone may be caused to output a visual image orseveral visual images which are captured through operation of the imagecapture device. The captured images correspond to the particular codethat is usable to authorize the transaction. Of course these approachesare exemplary of approaches that may be used.

Assuming that the user properly receives a code through their mobiledevice, the user inputs the code through at least one input device ofthe machine. While the server is waiting for receipt of the code, itoperates a timing program as represented in step 474. In this exemplaryembodiment, the server determines if the machine sends one or moremessages with data having a predetermined relationship to the particularcode within the permitted time period (e.g., a time out period). If suchmessages are not timely received, then the server operates in accordancewith its programming to send one or more messages to the automatedbanking machine which are operative to cause the machine not to allowthe transaction to proceed. This is represented in a step 476.

If the server receives one or more messages from the automated bankingmachine within the time period permitted, the server operates to receivethe user-inputted data (e.g., expected data corresponding to the code)as represented in step 478. The server then operates in accordance withits programming to evaluate this received data (corresponding to thecode) as represented in step 480. In step 480 the server operates tocompare and evaluate the data in the one or more received servermessages to determine if the data received has a predeterminedrelationship to the authorization data (i.e, the security code) that wassent in the one or more messages to the mobile phone. The predeterminedrelationship may require that the user-inputted data receivedidentically corresponds to the data that was sent to the mobile phone.Alternatively or in addition, the sent/received data may have amathematical or other relationship, or be within an predetermined rangeof acceptability. This may include for example that the data correspondsto a hash or other corresponding data that can be evaluated for purposesof determining that the proper code data has been input. Otherpredetermined relationship arrangements may be based on user-provideddata containing a predetermined percentage of sent characters or theirorder. Numerous approaches may be taken depending on the nature of theauthorization data that is sent to the cell phone and the particularprogramming of the system.

In a step 482 the server operates to make a determination whether thedata it has received has the required predetermined relationship to theauthorization data (e.g., code) which the server caused to be sent tothe cell phone. If the determination is negative, then the transactionis not authorized. In this case the server operates to send one or moremessages to the automated banking machine with data included thereinwhich indicates that the transaction is not to proceed. This isrepresented by step 476.

Alternatively, if the determination analysis indicates that the datainput by the user to the banking machine corresponds to the data (e.g.,code) sent in one or more messages to the cell phone, then the serveroperates to send one or more messages to the banking machine with dataincluded therein that indicates that the transaction is allowed toproceed. This is represented by step 484. As can be appreciated, thesemessages which are sent from the server to the automated banking machinecorrespond to the messages received through operation of the bankingmachine computer in step 440 shown in FIG. 25. Of course theseapproaches are exemplary.

Other embodiments may include other or additional approaches. This mayinclude for example a variation of the approaches already described. Inthis alternative approach, the transaction proceeds in the mannerpreviously discussed. However, rather than the automated banking machinesending messages which include the user inputted data (corresponding tothe code) to the server, and then have the server perform the datacomparison, the server operates in accordance with its programming tosend one or more messages including the code to the automated bankingmachine. This may include for example, the server sending datacorresponding to the generated code in one or more messages to theautomated banking machine. This enables the automated banking machine tocompare/determine if the user inputted data corresponds to theparticular code that the server generated. The automated banking machinemay operate in accordance with its programming to determine if the codedata input by the user corresponds to the code data that it has receivedfrom the server. The automated banking machine may also be in operativeconnection with comparison computers that can perform the datacomparison/determination on behalf of the machine.

Alternatively or in addition, the server may send a hash or other valuebased on a mathematical manipulation of the particular code data in away which enables the automated banking machine to operate to compare amathematical manipulation of what is input at the machine to theparticular data that the automated banking machine has received from theserver. In this manner the automated banking machine then makes thedetermination as to whether the user inputted data corresponds to theauthorization code sent to the mobile device so as to allow therequested transaction to proceed.

In still other embodiments, the system may operate to make the decisionat other points in the banking machine transaction flow. For example, anexemplary embodiment has been described as making a determinationconcerning whether the user inputted data corresponds to theauthorization data sent to the user's cell phone, prior to the machinesending messages to the host requesting the transaction. In alternativeembodiments, such host authorization allowing the transaction to occurmay be made at any point up through the time that the cash is dispensed(or other transaction steps which give monetary value the bankingmachine user have been carried out). For example, the automated bankingmachine, at any point in its logic flow before completing thetransaction, may operate in a modified form of its programming to makethe determination that the user inputted data corresponds to thesecurity data sent to the cell phone through operation of the server.This may have a transaction time advantage in the event that there is adelay in banking machine communication with the server, whereas thebanking machine communication with the host (to otherwise authorize thetransaction) is not delayed. Thus, the additional security authorizationcan occur simultaneously (and independently) with the transactionauthorization. However, completion (e.g., dispensing the cash) of thehost-authorized transaction will not be carried out until the additionalsecurity authorization is completed.

Further, it should be understood that the server 416 may be operatedlike the server of the incorporated disclosure so as to performmarketing or other messaging functions for the banking machine users inaddition to the authorization function. This may include for examplegiving a user the option to sign up for the service through the bankingmachine as previously discussed. It may also include the ability for theuser to change the cell phone notification information or other data asmay be appropriate. Alternatively, the authorization system and themarketing system may be operated as independent systems. The approachtaken depends on the particular systems used and the programming of thecomputers involved.

Alternatively, in other embodiments the host system may operate througha connection with a wireless communication system to perform the(server) functions described. These may include for example, the hostsystem being in communication with one or more databases or othercomputers which determine whether a particular user has requiredadditional authentication in order to conduct a transaction. Thus, thehost may operate in accordance with its programming to generate thecode, cause it to be sent to the user's cell phone, evaluate the datainput by the user to the banking machine, and carry out the other stepsthat are indicated in the previously described embodiment as carried outthrough operation of the server. Modifications may be made to the hostmessages to provide for the additional messages or for additionalmessage content so as to enable the host to have this addedfunctionality. Of course these approaches are exemplary and in otherembodiments other approaches may be used.

In still other embodiments, the banking machine can wirelessly send thesecurity code to the phone. For example, the machine may call the phone.Alternatively, the machine may use a RFID device to transmit the code tothe phone, requiring both the phone to be near the machine. Of courseother techniques for sending a security code from the machine to a phonemay be used. The automated banking machine may also be operated togenerate the security code.

Thus, the features and characteristics of the embodiments previouslydescribed achieve desirable results, eliminate difficulties encounteredin the use of prior devices and systems, solve problems and attain oneor more of the objectives stated above.

In the foregoing description certain terms have been used for brevity,clarity and understanding, however no unnecessary limitations are to beimplied therefrom because such terms are for descriptive purposes andare intended to be broadly construed. Moreover, the descriptions andillustrations given herein are by way of examples and the invention isnot limited to the exact details shown and described.

In the following claims any feature described as a means for performinga function shall be construed as encompassing any means capable ofperforming the recited function, and shall not be deemed limited to theparticular means shown in the foregoing description or mere equivalentsthereof.

Having described the features, discoveries and principals of theinvention, the manner in which it is constructed, operated, andutilized, and the advantages and useful results attained; the new anduseful structures, devices, elements, arrangements, parts, combinations,systems, equipment, operations, methods, processes, and relationshipsare set forth in the appended claims.

1. Apparatus comprising: a banking system comprising: at least oneautomated banking machine, wherein the at least one automated bankingmachine is operative to cause financial transfers responsive at least inpart to data read from user cards, wherein the at least one automatedbanking machine includes: at least one card reader,  wherein the atleast one card reader is operative to read from a card of a machineuser, card data corresponding to user identification data, at least onecash dispenser,  wherein the at least one cash dispenser is operative tocause stored cash to be dispensed, at least one computer,  wherein theat least one computer is in operative connection with the at least onecard reader and the at least one cash dispenser,  wherein the at leastone computer is operative during a transaction to  cause card data to beread from a user card through operation of the at least one card reader,and  cause cash to be dispensed from the machine through operation ofthe at least one cash dispenser,  wherein the at least one computer isoperative to cause a financial account to be assessed a value associatedwith cash dispensed, wherein the at least one automated banking machineis operative to receive from a machine user, at least one user inputincluding a secret code, data corresponding to a customer phone number,and a request for a cash dispense transaction associated with aparticular amount of cash, a server, wherein the server is locatedremotely from the at least one automated banking machine, wherein theserver is operative to receive from the at least one automated bankingmachine, at least one message associated with the request, wherein theserver is operative to generate a transaction security code associatedwith the cash dispense transaction, wherein the server is operativecause at least one message associated with the cash dispense transactionto be sent to a customer phone having the customer phone number, whereinthe at least one message includes  customer notification of the cashdispense transaction, and  the transaction security code, wherein the atleast one automated banking machine is operative to receive from amachine user, at least one user input including the transaction securitycode, wherein the at least one automated banking machine is operative tocause the particular amount of cash to be dispensed through operation ofthe at least one cash dispenser, responsive at least in part to thetransaction security code being received by the at least one automatedbanking machine within a predetermined time period in which the securitycode is required to be received to allow the cash dispense transactionto proceed.
 2. The apparatus according to claim 1 wherein the at leastone automated banking machine includes at least one biometric reader,wherein the at least one computer is operative to cause card data readby the at least one card reader to be compared with card informationstored in a user identification data store, wherein the at least onecomputer is operative to cause customer biometric data read by the atleast one biometric reader to be compared with biometric information inthe user identification data store, wherein a customer is authorized torequest the cash dispense transaction responsive at least in part to atleast one of computer-determined correspondence between read card dataand stored card information, and computer-determined correspondencebetween read biometric data and stored biometric information.
 3. Theapparatus according to claim 2 wherein a customer is authorized torequest the cash dispense transaction responsive at least in part toboth computer-determined correspondence between read card data andstored card information, and computer-determined correspondence betweenread biometric data and stored biometric information.
 4. The apparatusaccording to claim 1 wherein the at least one automated banking machineis in operative connection with at least one transaction host operativeto authorized the cash dispense transaction, and wherein the serverdiffers from the at least one transaction host.
 5. The apparatusaccording to claim 1 wherein the at least one automated banking machineis a sole automated banking machine, wherein the sole automated bankingmachine is operative to receive the secret code, the data correspondingto a customer phone number, the request for the cash dispensetransaction, and the transaction security code, wherein the soleautomated banking machine is operative to dispense the particular amountof cash.
 6. The apparatus according to claim 1 wherein the transactionsecurity code is time sensitive, wherein the transaction security codeis required to be received by the at least one automated banking machinewithin the predetermined time period to prevent cancellation of the cashdispense transaction.
 7. A method comprising: (a) carrying out automatedbanking machine-receiving of user input of a secret code; (b) carryingout automated banking machine-receiving of user input of a request forautomated banking machine-dispensing of a particular amount of cash; (c)subsequent to (b), carrying out automated banking machine-notifying of aremote server of a transaction corresponding to the request; (d)subsequent to (c), carrying out through operation of the server,generation a security code for the transaction; (e) subsequent to (d),carrying out through operation of the server, a sending of a message toa customer mobile phone associated with the request, wherein the messageincludes customer notification of the transaction, and the security codegenerated in (d), wherein the security code is associated with apredetermined time period in which the security code is required to beautomated banking machine-received to allow the transaction to proceed;(f) subsequent to (e), carrying out automated banking machine-receivingof user input of the security code; and (g) carrying out automatedbanking machine-dispensing of the particular amount of cash throughoperation of at least one cash dispenser, responsive at least in part tothe user input in (f) being received within the predetermined timeperiod.
 8. The method according to claim 7 wherein steps (a), (b), (c),(f), and (g) are carried out in a banking system including a pluralityof automated banking machines, wherein each automated banking machineincludes at least one computer, a card reader, a biometric reader, and acash dispenser, and further comprising: (h) operating the at least onecomputer to control at least one of the card reader to read user carddata; and the biometric reader to read user biometric data, (i)authorizing a machine user to request the transaction responsive atleast in part to at least one of computer-determined correspondencebetween read card data and stored card information, andcomputer-determined correspondence between read biometric data andstored biometric information.
 9. The method according to claim 7 andfurther comprising (h) prior to (d), carrying out automated bankingmachine-receiving of at least one user input of data corresponding to acustomer phone number affiliated with the customer mobile phone; wherein(e) includes operating the server to cause the at least one message tobe sent to the customer mobile phone through use of the customer phonenumber.
 10. The method according to claim 7 wherein steps (a), (b), (c),(f), and (g) are carried out through operation of the same automatedbanking machine.
 11. The method according to claim 7 wherein steps (a),(b), (c), (f), and (g) include operation of at least one automatedbanking machine in operative connection with at least one transactionhost operative to authorized the transaction, wherein in steps (d), and(e) the server differs from the at least one transaction host. 12.Apparatus comprising: a system, wherein the system includes at least oneautomated banking machine, wherein the at least one automated bankingmachine includes at least one cash dispenser, wherein the at least oneautomated banking machine is operative to receive at least one machineuser input including: a secret code, data corresponding to a customerphone number, a request for a cash dispense transaction associated witha particular amount of cash, and a time-sensitive transaction securitycode being:  associated with the cash dispense transaction request, different from the secret code,  server-generated,  server-sent usingthe customer phone number, and  automated banking machine-receivablewithin a predetermined time period to prevent cancellation of the cashdispense transaction; wherein the at least one automated banking machineis operative to cause the particular amount of cash to be dispensedthrough operation of the at least one cash dispenser, responsive atleast in part to the transaction security code being received by the atleast one automated banking machine from a machine user within thepredetermined time period.
 13. The apparatus according to claim 12wherein the customer phone number is affiliated with a customer mobilephone, and further comprising a server located remotely from the atleast one automated banking machine, wherein the server is operative togenerate the transaction security code, wherein the server is operativeto cause the transaction security code to be sent to the customer mobilephone through use of the customer phone number.
 14. The apparatusaccording to claim 13 wherein the at least one automated banking machineis in operative connection with at least one transaction host operativeto authorized the cash dispense transaction, and wherein the serverdiffers from the at least one transaction host.
 15. The apparatusaccording to claim 13 wherein the transaction security code comprises arandomly-generated security code, wherein the secret code comprises auser-selected code.
 16. The apparatus according to claim 12 wherein theat least one automated banking machine is a sole automated bankingmachine.
 17. The apparatus according to claim 12 wherein thepredetermined time period comprises a time period in which the securitycode is required to be automated banking machine-received to allow thecash dispense transaction to proceed.
 18. A method comprising: (a)carrying out automated banking machine-receiving of at least one userinput including a secret code; (b) carrying out automated bankingmachine-receiving of at least one user input including datacorresponding to a customer phone number; (c) carrying out automatedbanking machine-receiving of at least one user input including a requestfor a cash dispense transaction associated with a particular amount ofcash; (d) subsequent to (a), (b), and (c), carrying out automatedbanking machine-receiving of at least one user input including atime-sensitive transaction security code being: associated with the cashdispense transaction request, different from the secret code,server-generated, server-sent using the customer phone number, andautomated banking machine-receivable within a predetermined time periodto prevent cancellation of the cash dispense transaction; and (e)carrying out automated banking machine-dispensing of the particularamount of cash through operation of at least one cash dispenser,responsive at least in part to the transaction security code beingreceived in (d) within the predetermined time period.
 19. The methodaccording to claim 18 wherein the customer phone number is affiliatedwith a customer mobile phone, and further comprising (f) operating aserver to cause the transaction security code to be sent to the customermobile phone through use of the customer phone number.
 20. The methodaccording to claim 19 and further comprising (g) prior to (f), operatingthe server to generate the transaction security code.